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ABSTRACT

Although most readers of T. S. Eliot have agreed
that the European experience of world war and the
resultant political and cultural dislocations provided
an important context and source of imagery for much of
his work, what has not been recognized is Eliot's use of
figures of war to represent the intimate yet
antagonistic relations between the poet's writing of
modernity and the text that is history.

Beginning with

a tropological analysis of Eliot's "A Note on War
Poetry," relative to both the genre of war poetry and
aesthetic modernity, this study examines the figural
interpenetration of war and literary construction in
Eliot's two "post-war" poems "Gerontion" and The Waste
Land.

In these poems, figures of war express the

impulse to displace through formalist strategies of
appropriation the real and threatening proximity of war
to art, but, paradoxically, this very translation of the
vocabulary of war into the terms of art exposes the
inescapable correlation between the aesthetic and the
historical, a correlation increasingly problematic in a
time when all cultural forms seemed suddenly deprived of

their innocence. The study concludes with a close
analysis of the figuration of war in Eliot's wartime
poetry, the Four Quartets.

To write poetry in a time of

war, for T. S. Eliot, was to confront the accusations of
history's "horrific capability," accusations of poetry's
complicity, of its irrelevance, of its inadequacy.

To

figure such a threat into the poetry meant not to cancel
or to evade history's accusatory colloquy but, by giving
it form, to articulate the necessary implication of all
writing in the conditions of history.

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
"A NOTE ON WAR POETRY"

Hugh Kenner has recently observed that T.S. Eliot
has suffered the peculiar fate of never being credited
for noticing anything:

"We never ask what it's routine

to ask about Wordsworth or even Keats: what Thomas Eliot
may have observed when he opened his eyes, and what he
made of it"

(Muse 19).

The critical charge of myopia

seems unwarranted given that Eliot's reputation, however
tarnished in recent years,

still rests upon the accuracy

of The Waste l a n d 's diagnosis of the post-war milieu, a
poem written by a poet many have thought of as the great
diagnostician of twentieth-century life. And yet
Kenner's point is true. We do not observe Eliot
observing, bringing news of material specificities,

in

the way that Joyce or Pound did. Indeed, it is Kenner
himself who in his major work on Eliot, The Invisible
Poet,

stressed the Eliotic vagueness, a symbolist

strain that, coupled with a

naturally ironic temper.

produced a poetry of such vagueness that Kenner called
his style
literature"

"the most generalizing style in English
(Muse 42).

But now

Kenner presents an

alert, attentive onlooker bringing news of the
mechanical novelties of the twentieth century and
grasping their effects on the rhythms of consciousness.
For example, the passage from the "Preludes" that we
have all routinely generalized as exemplifying the
alienation of the modern urbanite-With the other masquerades
that time resumes,
One thinks of all the hands
That are raising dingy shades
In a thousand furnished rooms.
Kenner himself observes that Eliot "was bringing
news" of one of the century's new novelties, the massproduced cheap alarm clock, which created the new
world of the commuter and which explains why at one
moment one could count on a thousand hands pulling up
dingy shades--(i.e., the pull-down blind with springloaded rollers, which

was also one of the

novelties

that allowed one to gauge life's rhythms to mechanical
time rather than to the natural time of day and
n ight.) Or the hour when one left work,
when the eyes and back
Turn upward from the desk, when the human engine waits
Like a taxi throbbing waiting.

3

Kenner adds

:

And leaving the office one could choose the
elevator or the stairs:
This is the one way, and the other
Is the same . . .
The /o t h e r 7 way was 7the s a m e 7 in two respects: it
took you down, and it numbed your sensibility.
It
was the electric lift, in which you and your
fellow commuters did not move, but the box you
were standing in did the moving; a descent
. . .
not in movement
But abstention from movement; while the world
moves (Muse 24-25).
But,

if we do not observe Eliot observing,

E l i o t 7s observations are not, as

it is because

Kenner finally admits,

recognizable once embedded in the poem, crust as
Eliot,

in his thesis on Bradley,

. and laid together like bricks,"

facts for

are not "merely found . .
but are prepared for by

interpretive systems, so the observed facts are
assimilated and transformed by formalist strategies in such
a w a y that the phenomenon of observation is so overwhelmed
b y the foregrounding of rhetoricity that any recognition of
observed fact is subdued.
The methods are by now <juite familiar.

There are the

radical juxtapositions which remove conventional contexts
and replace them with intertextual ones that emphasize not
the word as object but rather the word as word--a

decontexualization that, undermining reference, seeks to
reanimate and intensify the tropological play of w o r d s .
There is also the method only used as successfully by
Rilke, which Paul De Man describes as a reversal of figural
relations:

"the inwardness that should belong to the

subject is located instead within things"

(Allegories 36).

Here, objects hold a dark, palpable subjectivity of their
own, not of the self that considers them, and yet, upon
approach, disappear into echo chambers of figural
resources.

Hugo Friedrich, referring to Sartre's

definition for this method as "a lyrical phenomenology,"
writes that it "does not so much deform things as make them
so inert, or impart so strange a vitality to things inert
by nature that a spooky unreality is created"

(qtd. in

Hamburger 29).
Eliot exploits this chiasmus of word and thing, of
feeling and sense, to confuse and to critique the nature of
boundaries, of those lines defining the accepted verities
of subject and object, those internal and external
divisions, which conventionally schematize experience. Like
many other writers and thinkers, Eliot was responding to
the new sense that reality no longer resided in an
objective universal order accessible through conceptual
categories, but was present in the irrational and
unconscious flux of experience.

Constructs of mind,

whether linguistic, religious, or scientific, are all
instrumental and provisional so that there is a gap between
them and an ineffable reality, a gap that leads to the
awareness that existence is determined by self-generated
and provisional constructs.

Eliot's blurring of outlines

is a method both destructive and generative--destructive in
the critique of reciprocity; generative in its attempt to
grasp an elusive reality by means of words, to ally the
universe of language with a unity of experience, to step
out of that which already has been written for us into a
new reality of words.

According to Eliot,

"art has to

create a new world and a new world must have a new
structure"

("London Letter"

[Aug.] 216).

Although very different in many respects, modernists
shared a faith in the indestructibility of the tie between
the word and its object, a logocentric view that offered
the possibilities of restructuring and transforming reality
through language.
Benstock states,

The power of language was, as Shari
"a transformative one, one that could

remake the perception of the world and against which the
world--despite its wars and crises of belief, despite
radical changes in cultural norms, and redefinitions of
physical and psychic occurrences--would remain stable"
(15).

Frederic Jameson has described this modernist

assumption as a "conviction that sense perception can

ultimately be fully rendered in a sentence structure, that
a 'parole pleine' is possible, that the world really does
exist to end up in a Book, which will replace it and in
which the glint of sunlight on a pond, the stir of wind
upon the earth's surfaces, will thus forever gleam and
mildly tremble in the eternal immobility of the printed
sentence"

(25-26).

Luxuriously put.

But invoking as it does Mallarme's

ancestral blood, Jameson's phrasing--which makes use of a
natural imagery suitable to any discussion of Eliot's
poetry, permeated as it i3 with images of light, sea and
vegetation--underscores the modernist's utopian desire to
return to a pristine state preceding the self's entry into
history, what Paul De Man describes as the impulse of
modernity, the desire to wipe out all anteriority,
everything that came earlier, rejecting temporality to
reach a point of true origin existent in a singular, nonhistorical present. However,

since "modernity" cannot

exist without the negation of history, each pole necessary
to the other's power,

the impulse of modernity is

inextricable from the realization of the ineluctably
historical nature of existence--historical, as De Man says,
"in the deepest sense of the term in that it implies the
necessary experience of any present as a passing experience
that makes the past irrevocable and unforgettable, because

it is inseparable from any present or future"

(Blindness

148-49). The privileging of the transformative power of the
word does not then occur without the paradoxical desire to
move beyond words through words, to move through words too
saturated with previous articulations, accents, diversities
of intent, through bearers of historical determinants, to
some neutral Word unmediated by its existence in history.
Or, as Eliot puts it, "to write poetry which should be
essentially poetry, with nothing poetic about it, poetry
standing naked in its bare bones, or poetry so transparent
that we should not see the poetry, but that which we are
meant to see through the poetry, poetry so transparent that
in reading it we are intent on what the poem points at, and
not on the poetry . . .

To get beyond poetry, as

Beethoven, in his later works, strove to get beyond
music.1,1
Meanwhile, below the moon, to return to Eliot's
observations,

the cultural artifacts of the furnished

flat, the massive crowds of commuters, the underground and
the telephone (which Kenner guesses to be the influence
behind the disembodied voices of The Wasteland) testify to
the effects of what some historians have called a Second
Industrial Revolution, one that changed modern modes of
^ r o m an unpublished 1933 lecture cguoted in Matthiessen
96.

living.

Consequently, they act as historical specificities

carrying the force of history defined in the modern sense
by Theodor Adorno as "Die Macht der Vergesellschaftung,"
those forces "organizing, rationalizing,
structure of society"

(56).

'socializing' the

The very presence of such

historically determined figures identifies the formalist
strategies of appropriation as arising from an inescapable
tension between the aesthetic and historical determinations
of words and the determinations of culture,

a tension

which throws what seems to be at first hand merely an
aesthetic or epistemological issue of reference and fact
into a conflict between the synchronic act of the poem and
the diachronic movement of history,

a conflict that Eliot

thematizes through the figuration of historically
determined objects: the trams, the tube, the face-down
crowds of commuters flowing over London Bridge.
But what of another of the century's historically
determined "objects" whose broad scope and influence was
made possible by the application of new technologies,
namely the experience of world war?

That Eliot took notice

is most certain; one could hardly not.

Along with the

American Civil War, the first two world wars introduced a
new kind of war.

For much of modern Western history,

inhumane character of war was restrained by its
institutionalization. War, a necessary evil, was an

the

institution, but one that did not interfere unduly with
other functions of society.

Restrained by what Freud

called the myth of the "fellowship in civilization,11 war
was conducted in such a way as to preserve the mold of
civilization, which included the antagonistic parties
(274) .

The distinction between combatant and noncombatant,

between those who are fit to fight and those who are not,
was maintained in the effort to preserve the humane
features of warfare and to confine violence through formal
structures of decorum and class structure--witness the
astonishing formalism of seventeenth- and eighteenthcentury warfare with its correlation of power and
aesthetics at the expense of efficiency.

During the

American Revolution, Americans continued to go abroad to
study medicine in Edinburgh or painting under Benjamin West
in London.

During the Napoleonic Wars, paths for traveling

armies were prescribed to allow for the freedom of civilian
life. During the Crimean War, Russia paid its debt to its
enemy Britain.
That World War I, as Henry James said, was a "plunge
of civilization into this abyss of blood and darkness"
(384) was not so much because of the massive logistics
involved or the extensive geographical area of hostilities,
the putrid conditions of the trenches, and the massive
number of casualties, but because of the changed character
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of war and the changed perception of the enemy.2

It was

total war, the endeavor to make the operations of war as
complete and all-encompassing as energy and technology are
able, to the point where all life becomes ancillary to the
logistical and tactical expression of the war machine.

The

destruction of armed resistance means not a contest between
two professional armies but a complete punitive operation
in which the entire living might of the enemy must be
totally and indiscriminately destroyed.

Bronislaw

Malinowski, writing during the second World War, describes
it t h u s :
Modern war makes it impossible to distinguish between
the military personnel of an army and the civilians;
between military objectives and the cultural portion of
national wealth; and the means of production, the
monuments, the churches and the laboratories.
Lines of
communication; seats of government; centers of industry;
and even centers of administrative, legal, and
scientific activity are rapidly becoming targets for
destruction, as much as garrisons, fortified lines, and
airdromes. . . War has to transform every single
cultural activity within a belligerent nation.
The
family and the school, the factory and the courts of
law, are affected so profoundly that their work--the
exercise of culture through autonomous self-contained
institutions--is temporarily paralyzed or distorted. At
present, it has become possible to transform some
hundred million human beings into one enormous war
machine.
(264)
In total war, the human being is increasingly reduced
to function, the individual submerged into a technological

2 For a discussion of the revolutionary quality of total
warfare, see Weaver 92-112.
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sublimity, bis aggression and passion abstracted into the
slogans of the state.

In short, people become material,

automatons of war.
Given that war, especially m o d e m total war, is, to
quote Wallace Stevens, the most "extreme pressure of the
contemporaneous," how much more will its presence be felt
in Eliot's poems?

Most readers of Eliot have agreed that

the European experience of world war and the resultant
political and cultural dislocations provided an important
context and source of imagery for much of his work--in
"Gerontion," the burden of a decayed Europe's heroic past;
in

The Waste Land, a vortex of invading hordes, exploding

cities, broken columns, and ruined towers; in Eliot's
translation of Saint-John de Perse's Anabasis, the
migratory conquests of Europe's pre-history;

in "Coriolan,"

the ironic triumph of 11post-peace11 politics; and in the
Four Quartets, the "constellated wars" of bombers and
blackouts, Krishna's battle yoga, civil war and civic duty,
antique drums and dead patrols.
But if this context of war in much of Eliot's poetry
(the above images being by no means exhaustive) is plain,
the radical implications of the representation of war for
the formalist project have been obscured by a text-centered
critical tradition that, duplicating the modernist
imperative to displace history through the patterning of
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rhetoric,

takes as axiomatic the formalist assumption of an

impermeable boundary between the historical matrix of
experience and the poetic text, without recognizing the
self-critique in the very method itself.
Canonical readings of Eliot's poetry, dominated by the
text-centered tradition of New Criticism,

insist that there

exists only an accidental or minimal relation between
context and text, for the text is perceived to be an
autonomous verbal construct that does not so much reflect
extra-verbal constructs as displace or transmute them.
Those holding such a view, therefore, most often relegate
references to war in the poetry to, as Stephen Greenblatt
says, the "well-lighted pigeonhole" of historical
background (103).

This is not to say that such

commentators have not been concerned with historical
themes.

Indeed, for the first forty years of Eliot

criticism, critics emphasized historical, public themes and
read the poetry as a topographical map of the age's
spiritual anxieties,

for the New Critic sees history not as

a Heraclitian flux of sociopolitical and economic ripples,
but as a river of revealed significance that always tells
the same story--hence the New Critical leitmotifs of the
fall from organic community, the loss of transcendent
order, the secularization, thus alienation of man from
communal values, the fragmentation of the modern world, and
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the quest for transcendent order.

In short, the view is

mythic, and as myth orders the chaos of discrete details
into a formal unity, so does art.

The act of synthesis,

the complexity of connotations held in the equipoise of
irony all harmonize the incongruities and complexity of
experience into a unified whole that restores and thus
reminds of a lost ideal order, based not on the logical
positivism of the modern age but on the forgotten realm of
analogy and correspondence. 3
Recognizing here the influence of the modernist
construct of history in which contingent, local
circumstances collapse into a grand narrative of community,
detractors of this position have been quick to attack this
methodology as one putting forward an ideological agenda
masquerading as historical truth. So, Catherine Belsey, as
a British academician trying to rout out the Leavis-Eliot
influence, detects behind the invocation of history a move
to suppress it by appealing to a grand narrative that shows
that in essence things are as they have always been: "they
constructed between them a lost Elizabethan utopia where
thought and feeling were one, where the native rhythm of
speech expressed in poetry the intuitive consciousness of

3 See Lewis Simpson's discussion of historicism and new
criticism in The Possibilities of Order: Cleanth Brooks and
His Work.
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an organic community, and everyone recognised in the
principle of order the necessity of submission to the
proper authorities, social and divine"

(17).

And Paul Bove, in Destructive Poetics, attacks the
modernist poetry of Eliot and Pound and the new critical
practice of Cleanth Brooks as an almost conspiratorial
attempt to "replace history with the Image of history":
"The poetic image of the Ideal put forward as the Word, the
autotelic ironic poem, is offered as an alternative not
only to positivistic actuality but to all historical and
temporal actuality as well"

(65)

But this is not a

question of historical criticism versus anti-historical
criticism; rather, it is a situation or, as Timothy Bahti
says in another context,

"a battle between theoretical

reflection and interpretive practice . . .

fought within a

conventional opposition between history and the nonhistorical"

(32).

Bove's fight is to effect a "critical

destruction of the Modern critical mind" and to replace it
with a Heideggerean hermeneutic; Belsey's is to integrate
Foucauldian strategies into a Marxist historicism.
To call formalist historicism non-historical is to
invoke a different view of history.

The word "history," as

Jonathan Culler has observed, is a powerful trope in its
appeal to the real, and thus serves as a powerful polemical
cudgel. To devalue the material aspects of history is only

to choose another view of the past.
becomes an appeal to Reality.

Appeal to history

One may object to the New

Critics' aesthetic view of history, but again, one may not
call it non-historical.

To return to the issue of war,

they do deal with the war; they simply abstract its
contingent, contemporary facts into a trope that figures
the spiritual collapse of the civitas, the fragmentation of
the mind of Europe into a symbol for the disorders of
history as opposed to the order of myth conferred by the
aesthetic.
In the last two decades, criticism of Eliot's poetry,
and especially of the early poetry, has veered away from
the public toward the private. The reasons for this shift
are numerous.

Among them are the publication of the

manuscripts of The Waste Land, in which both editorial
comment and textual evidence focused on the private theme,
as well as the simply practical reason of critical
exhaustion with aliusion-chasing and the futile search for
some external referent that would provide narrative order
to what appeared to be a web of fragments that veiled some
hidden agenda.

One contributing factor may have been the

increasing impatience with Eliot's domination over letters
for so many decades and the related need to subvert the
prominence of a poet one unhappy Jacobin would call "an
impressive catastrophe from which we may hope eventually to
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recover"

(Martin 12).

And one common strategy of

subjugation is the post-mortem exhumation of a poet's
"personal demons," of compulsions, obsessions and
idiosyncracies.
A less polemical influence, however, has been the
integration of Eliot's poetry into the Romantic lyrical
tradition and its valorization of the symbol as a mode of
transcendence of the conflict between the fixity of concept
and the dispersion of private emotion and sensation. While
early critics grounded their readings on the cultural
concerns of modernist rhetoric, critics of the last two
decades have grounded their readings on the epistemological
anxieties of modernist rhetoric. Working under the
guidelines of Eliot's doctrine of the objective correlative
and the adequation of personal emotion to impersonality of
form, critics have concentrated on the "element of deep
personal emotion"

(Moody 47) and on the struggle to

transmute private emotion into an aesthetic form that in
its impersonality expresses a permanent truth about the
life of the individual.

Presenting "a consciousness aware

of its own inner divisions," the poems become a series of
textual strategies to organize, control, and transcend
dueling psychic forces.
Unified by a common concern with the psychology of the
lyric voice, critics generally disagree only in regard to
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whether the poetry is perceived as succeeding in its g o a l .
While many critics read the poetry as a space of freedom in
which aesthetic form provides an avenue to selfintegration, others, assuming the same private concern,
disallow any such valorization of aesthetic form, arguing
that the poetry takes place within the play of psychic
oppositions. These conflicts have been discussed in
numerous ways: conflict between the rational and active
will and the intuitive passive self; between sexual desire
and the opposing need for order and self-restraint; between
romantic terror and yearning and intellectual detachment.
The context for such polarities is most often posited as
the split in Eliot's work between the symbolist strain
which struggles to effect an autotelic poetry, reaching the
condition of music, and the classical strain, which in
search of moral and ontological fixity, struggles to
express or objectify the depths of the buried self.4
The context of war, specifically of the Second World
War,

is usually brought in to point to the contrast between

the brutality of the contemporary crisis and Eliot's
figuration of war in the Four Quartets--a figuration
attacked as either an escapist or irresponsible
assimilation of a grave public situation into private
4 See Stead, Bergonzi, Bornstein, Moody, Traversi, Bush,
S p urr.

concerns.

Bernard Bergonzi, discussing Eliot's failure to

engage truly the immediacy of history in the Quartets,
complains that "one sees little sign of the events of 194 0,
the year of Dunkirk, the fall of France and the Battle of
Britain"

(151).

Graham Martin also attacks the figuration

of war in "Little Gidding" as an irresponsible refusal to
grapple meaningfully with the specific crisis at hand:

"The

London blitz is merely assimilated (though brilliantly) to
the private theme; and in 1942 who but Eliot would be
likely to have felt drawn away from the contemporary crisis
by the 'antique drum' of Charles the Martyr's confrontation
with Oliver Cromwell?"

(19)

And recently, M.L. Rosenthal,

in a reference to the famous "l'entre deux guerres"
passage of "East Coker" and to the Krishna-Arjuna section
of "Dry Salvages," objects:

"World War II had been under

way for almost two years, and perhaps the military phrasing
sprinkled through the passage suggests a twitch of stimulus
to respond.

. . Given the realities of the war and of Nazi

behavior, though, neither passage can be taken seriously in
this sense. The one combines personal self-pity with a
poet-workman's complaint about his medium.

The other talks

of a 'field of battle' almost incidentally, and hardly in
terms relevant to blitzkrieg and genocide"
Once again, we find evidence of the

(1043) .
current

irritability with a poetry that seems to eschew political

and moral relevance, that seems to refuse "historical
engagement" in favor of private concerns.

But,

underpinning Rosenthal's demand for a public stance,
certain moral responsibility is something else.

for a

The

particular irritant is not the unsuitability of war's being
the subject of lyrical treatment but the unsuitability of
war's being used to ground and to figure lyrical anxieties-a figuration that suggests that Eliot irresponsibly and
perversely extorts a situation of collective suffering for
his own mandarin needs, instead of properly integrating his
private concern into a level of generality that would speak
to the historical crisis at hand.

Indeed, these objections

reflect an underlying, normative expectation of the proper
relation of the lyric to the subject of war--an
expectation arising from the presence of a new genre,
namely that of "war poetry."

Rosenthal's objection,

grounded as it is by generic assumptions of what poetry in
a time of war should do, interestingly exposes a problem
concerning the relation between a poetics of private
experience and the historical pressure of war, a problem
that the Eliot passages self-consciously generate. But
since Rosenthal's objection, not to mention Eliot's own
text, arises out of the presence of war poetry, we must
investigate the criteria of the modern war lyric so as to
understand the implications of the radical intrusion of

figures of war into a text that appears to be concerned
solely with an internal struggle between language and
experience; for although war poetry and modernist poetry
have been conveniently separated as categories of critical
discussion,

such a distinction should not obscure the fact

that both endeavors, however different in styles, theories,
or response, confront a similar problem: What is the proper
relation between poetry and war in a time when literary
representation,

in its pursuit of Reality,

is forced to

grapple with a fact that threatens not only the validity of
any literary endeavor but the validity of the concept of
civilization?
it would be Henry dames, in his characteristic
prophetic omniscience, who would early in the Great War
perceive its implications for literary effort, and who not
only expressed the moral shock of the situation but also
predicted what would be an ongoing question for the rest of
the century.

In the often-quoted "war letter" to Howard

Sturgis, written on the heels of England's declaration of
war,

James would first observe the war as a betrayal of

history:
The plunge of civilization into this abyss of
blood and darkness by the wanton feat of those
two infamous autocrats is a thing that so gives
away the whole long age during which we have
supposed the world to be, with whatever
abatement, gradually bettering, that to have to
take it all now for what the treacherous years
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were all the while making for and meaning is
too tragic for words.
(384)
Then, six months later, he would write of the problem of
the artist struggling to reflect adequately contemporary
reality in a universe where the very appeal to Reality
necessarily becomes implicated in a delusion:
The subject-matter of one's effort has become
itself utterly treacherous and false--its
relation to reality utterly given away and
smashed.
Reality is a word that was to be
capable of this--and how represent that
horrific capability, historically latent,
historically ahead of it? How on the other hand
not represent it either--without putting into
play mere fiddlesticks? (446)
Robert Spoo, in an essay on James Joyce's treatment of the
War in Ulysses, paraphrases James's question:

"how write a

novel about the modern world, with men and women as we know
them, without somehow figuring the war into the account?
There is no going back,

James feels,no

facts, for we know what

we know.

blinking at the

. .. How represent such a

nightmare as the one that has descended upon us?

Which

window of the House of Fiction will «. Tve properly onto this
scene?"

(149)

But the troubled how's of James's passage

further imply a certain

hopelessness at finding such

a

window, since they reveal an anxiety at finding the
possible point of contact between imaginative structures
and a historical reality harboring such barbarism.

We will find a related anxiety if we turn to the
attempt by both war poets and editors of war poetry
collections to establish the legitimacy of this genre,5 a
tension between the attempt to define the parameters of the
true war poem on the basis of authenticity and realism and
the simultaneous attempt to prevent the poem's being
categorized by its very theme.
today fill library shelves,

Collections of war poetry

holding within their covers

selections from writers as diverse as Euripides, Horace,
Emerson, Plath, and Jonson, a miscellany claiming a
universality for the genre as if, since war seems to have
always been with us, the title "war poetry" would hold all
poetry ostensibly concerned with war.

But "war poetry" is

a guite modern phenomenon, arising with the first modern
war, the Civil War, and developing during World War 1 by
means of the efficient linking of the English literary
establishment to the propaganda machinery demanded by
modern warfare

(See Wright 70-100).

Yet to speak of "war

poetry" is not to invoke the carefully orchestrated,
ideological defense of Britain by such men of letters as
5 See, for example, Poems of War and Battle, ed. vere
Henry Collins (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914); The Oxford
Book of War Poetry, ed. Jon Stallworthy (New York: Oxford
Univ. Press, 1984); War and the Poet, ed. Richard Eberhart
and Selden Rodman (New York: Devin-Adair Co., 1945); The War
Poets, ed.
Oscar Williams (Miami, F l a . : Granger Books,
1945); A Treasury of British War Poetry (London: Hodder and
Stoughton, 1917).
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Newbolt, Kipling or Bridges but to invoke the poetry of
what John Pudney has called "the modern legend of the War
Poet"--the war lyrics of writer-combatants--Brooke, Jones,
Owen, Sassoon, and others--that would continue even into
the war poetry of World War II, a legend whose anatomy has
been so carefully studied by Paul Fussell in The Great War
and Modern Memory.
The war poetry of the writer-combatants was new
because its joining of the lyric impulse to the personal
experience of the brutal conditions made any grand
treatment either obsolete or obscene.

Neither glorifying

war nor nations, the modern war poem substitutes personal
expression for public declamation, authentic experience
being thought more deeply true than the grand abstractions
of public forms and themes.

Wilfred Owen would be the

first to mark this effort to distance the war poem from
patriotic versification:

"This book is not about heroes.

English Poetry is not yet fit to speak of them.

Nor is it

about deeds, or lands, nor anything about glory, honour,
might, majesty, dominion, or power, except War.

Above all

I am not concerned with Poetry. My subject is War, and the
pity of war.

The Poetry is in the pity"

(31) .

Poetry, if

it is to be a "true commentary on war," is to speak of the
tragedy of immediate occasion, is to be honest in its
elegy, satire, irony, or pathos.

The numbing dimension of
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modern war is perceived as too large for adequate treatment
or, as Thomas Hardy thought, as too tragic, the only
alternative being "to provide footnotes, the small,
detailed cameos of our own experience"
19).

(qtd. in Williams

To grasp the tragedy of war is to grasp it

emotionally,
Doren,

the criterion being, according to Mark Van

"a matter of registering experience and feeling"

(Williams 20).
This high value placed on authenticity of experience
leads quickly enough to the distinction between the
combatant and noncombatant and, on the part of the
combatant, an ensuing distrust of civilian war poetry, not
only because civilians tended to write the patriotic "buckme-up, 11 but also because the civilian could not possibly
render the authentic experience of war and at worst, would,
according to Frederic Prokosch, render a "form of
compensation for the sense of guilt deriving from inaction,
a luxuriant steambath of second hand and third-hand
emotion"

(Williams 19).

Ezra Pound himself,

searching for

a way to set down "real war emotion," would be troubled by
the doubt that the non-combatant could ever come close to
the kind of authenticity needed to avoid either commercial
opportunism or literary falsity (See Longenbach Stone
Cottage 105-34).

The problem for the combatant was to

write of the war experience

authentically without
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pandering to the public desire for vicarious titillation or
inspirational moralizing.
Alongside this growing definition of the "true war
poem," there is in many of the same prefaces to war poetry
collections a curious reluctance to admit any necessary
relation between war and poetry.

In defense oif poetry's

autonomy, primacy is denied to the conditions of war and
their influence upon the creation of the genre.

An appeal

is made to the "spiritual" or "general" and thus atemporal
qualities of art, seeking to distance art both from the
collective cry for inspirational war poetry and from the
authentic particularities of barbarism.

The appeal is

common and is made along two overlapping fronts:

1)

war,

which is essentially destructive, is antithetical to art,
which is essentially creative -- John Berryman: . "I should
be sorry if the relation between one of man's most
destructive and witless activities and one of his most
purely and intelligently creative activities should seem to
be very close or satisfactory"

(Williams 29).

2)

War,

since it is merely a subject, neither encourages great
poetry, nor makes great poets.

Although war and its

conditions provide matter for the poem, poetry,
essential operation of the spirit"

"a complex

(Eberhart), in its

pursuit of a level of generality transcends its subject
matter, thus making war irrelevant to its essence.
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George Herbert Clarke, writing in a preface to

a

volume of war poetry in 1917, affirms that "the first duty
of the war-poet toward his art is to be a poet, to discover
the timeless and placeless in the momentary and parochial,
and to bring back to us a true and moving report of the
experience and behaviour of the human spirit during its
recurrent struggle with its own worser self"

(35).

And,

Henry Treece, ringing the same changes in 1945, affirms
that "War, as X see it here and now, is not the material of
poetry.

Lasting poetry must go down deeper than the

superficial appearances of war machines; it must seek out
the spirit of man in pain and glory, and must express that
spirit and that pain and that glory in simple terms, in
those fundamental statements to which the mechanisms of
contemporary warfare are irrelevant"

(Williams 24).

If we turn to T. S. Eliot's only public statement
concerning the relation of war to poetry, a brief essay
written in 1942, we will find him making many of the same
points, arguing for the essential independence of poetry as
poetry from the influence of the "shock of war" or the
collective demands of patriotism ("Wartime" 351).
Differences arise, however, from

his assumed position of

authority and from his characteristic use of irony to
reinforce that position.

Writing neither as a "war poet"

nor as an editor, his critical pre-eminence conspicuous,

Eliot, the "Elder Statesman of Poetic Revolution, 1,6
speaks from the Republic of Letters on a provincial matter,
whose issues have been clouded by insufficient grounding in
the essential elements of Art.

The title of the essay,

"T.

S. Eliot on Poetry in Wartime," itself testifies to this
role, as does Eliot's bland, ironic tone of genial
equanimity.

Eliot's irony tells more pointedly, however,

in its dismissiveness: characteristically, he takes a
Question and, instead of answering it, forms it into
another question by turning the possible responses into
dichotomies, which, once placed within the context of the
new question, are nullified by being shown to be
inadequate.

The original question, ethical in nature--how

should poetry be written in a time of war?--produced two
responses, those of inspirational public poetry and the
private war lyric.

Eliot renders both irrelevant by posing

a new question, aesthetic in nature--is the poetry of war
necessarily a better type of poetry?
Answering the public's outcry for an inspirational war
poetry, Eliot criticizes the notion that war necessarily
produces a great poetry. During time of war, he says, there
are two types of "war poetry": patriotic poetry "which

6 The label is Kenner's, one which Eliot would have
approved given his response to one interviewer, "One seems to
become a myth, a fabulous creature that doesn't exist."
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expresses and stimulates pride in the military virtues of a
people" and a private poetry that arises out of an
individual's experience of war, a poetry usually of
“lament, involving pity and regret . . .

involving issues

of threat to liberty, sorrow at defeat, or indignation" or
of "some limited experience, even trivial experience such
as cold, discomfort, or the boredom." As for the first
type, the patriotic, there is no historical example of a
great poetry:
The greatest war poem of Europe is Homer's Iliad:
it was not written during the Trojan War; and,
although Homer was a Greek, I think that he makes
the Greeks appear rather more unpleasant than the
Trojans. Dante, no doubt was passionately devoted
to his native Florence, and he certainly lived
through a period of disorder; but I think that his
love of Florence is revealed not by recital of her
martial glories, but by his vehement lament over her
corruption.
At the time of the Napoleonic Wars,
both Wordsworth and Goethe were living and working:
neither of them can be accused of lack of public
spirit, but neither is conspicuous for having made
poetry out of the wars of his time . . . There is no
first-rate poem about the victory over the Armada or
the Battle of Trafalgar.
Conceding that patriotism supplies the emotional center for
much of the work of Shakespeare and Milton, Eliot points
out that their poetry did "not need the shock of war to set
it to work."

If the poet feels any duty as poet, it is

toward his language, to preserve and to enrich the
heritage. Conceding, too, that many good poems have been
written by soldiers on the World War I front and that
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during the current war, poets in military service write
from the context of war, Eliot states that the poems are
most often expressions of some limited personal experience,
even trivial experience, rather than expressions of the
large experience of war itself.

"You cannot understand

war--with the kind of understanding needed for writing
poetry . . . while you are in the midst"; it must "become
part of a man's whole past," and if it is to "bear fruit"
in poetry,

"it is likely to bear fruit in something very

different from what, during time of war, people call 'war
poetry'"

(351).

The fall of Dunkirk, blitzkrieg--the

extreme pressure of the contemporaneous--must be collapsed
into a larger "life."
And, in a poem written the same year, entitled "A Note
on War Poetry,"

Eliot repeats the argument of the essay:

Not the expression of collective emotion
Imperfectly reflected in the daily papers.
Where is the point at which the merely individual
Explosion breaks
in the path of an action merely typical
To create the universal, originate a symbol
Out of the impact? This is a meeting
On which we attend
Of forces beyond control by experiment-Of Nature and the Spirit. Mostly the individual
Experience is too large, or too small. Our emotions
Are only 'incidents'
In the effort to keep day and night together.
It seems just possible that a poem might happen
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To a very young man: but a poem is not poetry-That is a life.
War is not a life: it is a situation.
One which may neither be ignored nor accepted,
A problem to be met with ambush and stratagem.
Enveloped and scattered.
The enduring is not a substitute for the transient,
Neither one for the other. But the abstract conception
Of private experience at its greatest intensity
Becoming universal, which we call 'poetry',
May be affirmed in verse.

Yes--Poetry, that abstract, hence universal conception of
private experience, that transubstantiation of historicity,
that symbolically enclosed autotelic world.

But the

rhetorical praxis of the poem in its figuration of war to
express the nature of the poetic act subverts this
proposition by relating the violence of war to the violence
of symbolic enclosure, a violence that motivates the
displacement of history not because of some fastidious
disdain for the quotidian but because of an anxiety arising
from this equation of destruction with the synthesizing
structures of the poetic act.
But, how exactly is war figured in this poem?

Through

a figural ambiguity, of which an analysis may not only do
much to clarify this poem but may also provide a basis by
which to discuss how war figures in Eliot's work as a
whole. In the discussion that follows, the terms

31
metaphorical and metaphor refer not to metaphor as a
generic term denoting any figural relation, but rather
metaphor as one of the so-called four major tropes,
defined by Kenneth Burke in A Grammar of Motives
If the figure of war is metaphorical,
based on resemblance,

as

(503-17).

that is, if it is

then the argument is as follows:

The writing of poetry is like the waging of war
because they are both agonistic a c t s .

Poetry here is a war

between the abstract and the particular, a struggle to
achieve the symbol, the form of mediation.
process of mediation is violent,

For Eliot, this

thus the tropic use of

war. The transformation of the merely individual and the
merely typical into the universal is like an explosion
breaking in a path of action.

If one rearticulates the

opposites of individual and universal in terms of the
religious opposites of Nature and Spirit, the process of
incarnation (or if one prefers, of "totalization")

is cast

in a context of a violent meeting of forces, which we
"attend u p o n , " in the military sense of accompanying or
waiting upon an enemy for hostile purposes. But if we are
in attendance, our attendance is somehow inadequate,

for

this meeting is beyond our "control by experiment,"
experiment in the sense of any empowered action of testing,
but also experiment in its archaic sense of experience.
Next to the mysterious and uncontrollable meeting of Nature

and Spirit, the individual experience is either too large
or too small.

Introducing the psychological counterpart to

the above dichotomies of individual and typical. Nature and
Spirit, Eliot posits the struggle of the experiential self
to maintain some continuity, from moment to moment, from
day to night, as a military effort, but only a small one,
only one incident in a campaign of forces beyond
apprehension or control. This is not to say that one poem
may not arise out of one experience, or one incident, but,
as Eliot always maintained, the writing of a poem is
distinct from the achievement of poetry: one is transient,
the other, which is a "life," is enduring.
Yet to read the figural relation of Eliot's poem this
way, solely in terms of metaphor, would be to ignore the
primary focus, which is not the writing of poetry in
general, but the writing of poetry in the specific context
of war or the writing of poetry about war--a focus
suggesting relations of metonymy. Metonymy, often described
as the part standing for the whole, is a figure in which
one phenomenon is substituted for another that stands in
close relation.

While the metaphorical relationship is one

based on the shared property of two elements, or one could
say on a common predicate, the metonymic relation is one of
contiguity, an extrinsic relation, whether causal or
material, so that the effect could stand for the cause, the
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agent for the effect,

the inventor for the invented,

the

container for the contained. Thus the properties of war can
become metonymical substitutions for the activity of poetry
since war is the literal context or even motivation and
hence material cause for the writing of poetry.

When Eliot

writes
Where is the point at which the merely individual
Explosion breaks
In the path of an action merely typical
To create the universal, originate a symbol
Out of the impact?
the relation between the destructive and the creative is
not an "as i f ," since the context concerns the poet writing
in wartime, where explosions do break in paths of action
and where a poet writing a poem about a battle may struggle
to originate a symbol out of the impact. A poet ma y find
himself writing in a time of war, and he may write about
war from experience; so, a state of chance juxtaposition
between the life of a man suffering a time of war and the
life of a poet writing in a time of war may exist. The
metonymic relation of war to poetry, because based on
extrinsic relations, excludes any necessary influence or
equation between the two,

for the part-to-part relations of

metonymy are never based on a shared quality or intrinsic
connection. This would seem to explain the implication of
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uncertainty and hazard of the phrases "Where is the point .
. . ,"

"it seems just possible," "a poem might happen."

Nevertheless, the very fact that a figural relation
exists at all demands more than metonymy.

So,

interpretation vacillates between the extrinsic relation of
contiguity and an inclusive relation of resemblance, a
vacillation between difference and identity that can be
explained by the fact that as Gerard Genette maintains,
"every metonymy can be converted into a synecdoche by
appeal to a higher totality"

(109).

Both metonymy and

synecdoche involve relations between parts to wholes
(whether metonymy is a form of synecdoche, or synecdoche a
special function of metonymy depends upon which rhetorician
one reads), but while metonymy is always a reduction of
either a whole to one of its parts or the reduction of one
part to the status of another part, synecdoche assumes an
intrinsic relationship of shared essence so that, to refer
to Hayden white's definition, two parts are constructed "in
the manner of an integration within a whole that is
qualitatively different from the sum of the parts and of
which the parts are but microcosmic replications"

(35) .

If

metonymy reduces, synecdoche represents so that either side
of an equation may represent the other.

In synecdoche, the

relation between the literal and the tropic are compatible
because they "belong" to each other.

Thus, in Eliot's
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poem, the ambiguity of figural intention arises out of the
fluctuation between metonymic and synecdochic relations.
The whole process of mediation of the dichotomies of
experience, which involves both the struggle with language
or the formal to embody the experiential or the particular,
is reduced to the activity of war. At the same time, there
is an opposite movement toward integration. If to represent
synecdochically is to suggest an organic belonging, then
the analogical drive to integrate particular phenomena into
a meaningful totality is an act of power, the shared
ontology of poetry and war.
After the fourth stanza, the figural relation between
war and poetry abruptly stops, and two stanzas, completely
discrete, follow, one on the situation of war, the other on
the entelechy of poetry:
War is not a life: it is a situation,
One which may neither be ignored nor accepted,
A problem to be met with ambush and stratagem,
Enveloped and scattered.
The enduring is not a substitute for the transient.
Neither one for the other. But the abstract
conception
Of private experience at its greatest intensity
Becoming universal, which we call 'poetry'.
May be affirmed in verse.
Now there is no participation, no shared ontology; now the
only relation between poetry and war is difference:
[Poetry] is a life/ War is not a life."

"That
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The alignment o£ life and poetry against war and
situations depends upon an underlying distinction between,
on the one hand, history defined as mere events,
chronological bits, relative positions and sets of
circumstances, particular or striking complexes relative to
context and, on the other,

"life" as a transhistorical

reality of lived, shared experience, the "Erlebnis" of
modern historicism, that deeper reality made up of the
experience of humankind considered independent of
particular changes in time and location.

Poetry embodies

this "life" and as such seems to have a moral function in
its expression of an independence from a historical
situation antithetical to its and our "life."

Once again,

we seem to have the traditional view of aesthetic
formalism, which insists on the separation of history and
art.

Although this retreat from figuration may result from

anxiety, from a need to invalidate the real and threatening
proximity of war to art suggested by the figuration, we are
told that war is not a situation to be ignored or accepted,
that it is to be met with "ambush and stratagem,/ Enveloped
and scattered." Art denies its kinship to war and
defensively responds by attempting to absorb into itself
the violence of history.
The "contact," however, between this formal violence
of poetry, scattering and ambushing, and the violence of
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history is subverted by the retreat from figuration of war
into the serene detachment of the last stanza.

The last

stanza concludes the poem's appeal to the wholeness of a
life somehow completed in its seamlessness yet unfinalized,
a wholeness that stands in opposition to the broken bits of
"situation," a conclusion which points to the lifeenhancing, history-denying properties of the symbolic
order.

Thus, the interrelationship of temporal counters

throughout the poem is significant.

The daily chronicles,

individual actions and transient situations are points of
contact, necessary counterpoints to the universal,
enduring, or typical occurrences of life; poetic discourse,
an inevitable fugue of time.

Poetry is to participate in a

generality, not of the "collective" will, but a generality
effected by a descent into individuation,

the "intensity"

of which culminates in a condition of universality which
meshes all incongruities into the "life" of the symbol, a
life above a life.

Here times, customary tenses, are

abstracted, by means of the symbol, not into eternity but
into some absolute time of ideal conditions,

its tenses

formed by, but independent of, the histories of past and
present.

Notwithstanding,

the cynical tone of the last

line's "may be affirmed in verse" and the switch from the
august "Poetry" to the mundane "verse" mark the tenuousness
of affairs here.
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As we have seen, the poem's figuration of war both
absorbs war into the terms of art and reduces art to war,
much like Wittgenstein's box, which, depending on the trick
of the eye, can be solid, lidless, open, or not a box at
all ("the text interprets the illustration every time")
(3e).

Depending on how one reads Eliot's figural trick,

the poem either metonymically glosses the war poet question
or metaphorically "collapses" the subject of war into a
seemingly distinct concern, yet it is the synecdochic hinge
of the vacillation itself that exposes the broader and
inclusive concern, the relation of the aesthetic to the
historical, and the necessity of writing modernity-modernity understood not as a historical but as an
aesthetic and normative concept--a distinction first
artistically realized by Baudelaire, whose opposition of
modernity (roughly equivalent to DeMan's impulse of
modernity as discussed earlier) to historical modernity
resonates behind Eliot's "conflict" of dichotomies, not to
mention behind the theories of the genre of war poetry.
Baudelaire, achieving almost a mythic status as the
originator of the modern, the discoverer of "1'avenement du
neuf," recognized what Matei Calinescu describes as a split
in the concept of modernity into aesthetic modernity and
historical modernity, a fissure coming out of a profound
historical relativism (4 0) .

Historical modernity is the
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period we associate with bourgeois culture,

its

comprehensive technological revolutions, its values of
pragmatism, reason, action, success and progress.
Aesthetic modernity, also based on sweeping historical
change arising and sometimes synonymous with romanticism,
involves the aesthetics of transitoriness and immanence,
whose values revolve around novelty produced by change,
goal the formal seizure of presentness.

its

More of an

achieved condition than a period concept, aesthetic
modernity takes as its stimulus and raison d'etre an
intractable opposition to past tradition, to bourgeois
modernity, and sometimes even to itself because of its own
inescapable dependence on historical modernity.

The

challenge of modernity entails several problems:

1) how to

express the newness of the present without basing the
aesthetic upon socio-historical
are inimical to it;

conditions

whose values

2) how to make the brutality of modern

life poetic, the banal heroic, the sordid mysterious; 3)
how to keep the independence and stability afforded by
tradition but not its claims of an abstract academicism and
at the same time be true to the transitory nature of the
moment without falling into mere fashion (what DeMan calls
the ashes of a true modernity).
Baudelaire's solution to this problem of alienation
both from an oppressive past and a sordid present is his

concept of modernity set forth in "Le Peintre de la vie
ffloderne."

A quick paraphrase of his argument

how Eliot's poem plays off of its terms.

will show

He argues that

every artistic creation must combine the "eternal" and the
"immutable" with the "transitory," the "fugitive" and the
"contingent," must distill the permanent from the everchanging present in order to extract from fashion the
"poetry which lives in the historical"

(13).

Allegiance

first belongs to the purity of instantaneity, grasped
through the force of imagination, a modernite of such
precision that the veneer of conventional reality cracks,
allowing the artistic eye to go beneath the banality of
observable appearances to a reality where the ephemeral and
the eternal are one.

Much more than a claim for the

validity of modern subjects (that being an old song since
the fifth century), Baudelaire's emphasis on the sordid and
the brutal was to lead through the alchemy of art to the
poetic, for the act of modernite must take place along the
pressure points of the antithetic--the general-particular,
sensory-ideal, spiritual-material--not reconciling
oppositions into a higher synthesis but through the acute
play on contrast, forcing a transient and mystical
transformation of reality into a more real reality.

Ever

grounded in the consciousness of the irreversibility of
time, modernity becomes an act, both normative and heroic,
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whose exercise must be repeated with each successive
generation.

Matei Calinescu describes this ongoing attempt

to reconcile permanence and change, the past and present as
"the paradoxical possibility of going beyond the flow of
history through the consciousness of historicity in its
most concrete immediacy, in its presentness." He continues,
"Aesthetically speaking,

'the eternal half of beauty'

(consisting of the most general laws of art) can be
brought to a fleeting life (or afterlife) only through the
experience of modern beauty.

In its turn, modern beauty is

included in the transhistorical realm of values--it becomes
'antiquity'--but only at the price of renouncing any claim
to serve as a model . . . Separated from tradition . . . .
artistic creation becomes an adventure and a drama"

(50).

Certainly Eliot would.not use the term "modern" or any
other words fallen from its tree with the veneration of the
time, yet oddly enough, Eliot's idiosyncratic use of the
words "tradition," "classicism," and the "historical sense"
would carry very much the same intimations as Baudelaire's
modernity.

However polemical in context, each term in some

way would point to some adequation of the present to the
past. Historians of English modernism have shown how
Eliot's contribution to early modernism was his strategic
use of values deemed corruptive and repressive such as
tradition, rhetoric, and impersonality to effect the avant-

garde values of originality/ authenticity and radicalism.
So Eliot's early prose revolves around paradoxes: the
anti-rhetorical poetry of free verse will end up in a
"vicious rhetoric," to write only of the contemporary will
be to end up "in obsolescence," and only through the threat
of the conventional or of rhetorical difficulty can the
effect of sincerity be given.

Beneath the strategic and

practical uses of such ironism lay the realization of the
supple paradoxes of modernity.

To appear most

contemporary, a tradition must be created that would offer
on the surface the legitimacy of orthodoxy yet be available
for the opposition, appropriation or revision of the
present. The invention, reclaiming, and propagation of
genealogies would offer the suppleness required of a
tradition that would be static, yet changing, multivocal
yet unified by the local point of appropriation in the
present. So Baudelaire's modernity, "a poetry which lives
in the historical," would become Eliot's "historical
sense": "This historical sense, which is a sense of the
timeless as well as of the temporal and of the timeless and
of the temporal together, is what makes a writer
traditional.

And it is at the same time what makes a

writer most acutely conscious of his place in time, of his
contemporaneity"

("Tradition" 37).

To be conscious of

one's place in time, to be able to locate the demarcations

of the permanent and the transient involves the fictive
assumption of an Archimedean point, a neutral point of
observation,

independent of the obfuscations of language

and experience. Indeed, Jeffrey Perl notes Eliot's
assumption in his essays "of a vantage point outside of
tradition, or more specifically at the end of one.

. . the

belief that the late-modern vantage point makes visible,
for the first time, the curve of modern history"

(69).

The

ideal of mythic consciousness, the ability to hold the
contingencies of history within an enclosure of form that
would allow for the independence of observation and at the
same time for the meaningfulness of experience--thus
Eliot's "note" can be read as an attempt to find that
"point"

("Where is the point at which the merely

individual..."), the figure of war being merely an
available,

if not cliched, trope for transforming the

private specificities of experience into the general and
impersonal form of the symbol.

And indeed, the few critics

who have mentioned this poem usually quote only the last
stanza without any discussion of its context of war poetry.
However,

it is the very subject of war poetry specifically

that identifies the necessity of writing modernity
underlying the "conflict" of dichotomies.
In the attempt of war poetry to successfully present
the immediate experience of war in all its novel misery
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without losing a transhistorical value that asserted the
independence of human experience over and against history,
it duplicated the exigencies of aesthetic modernity.

In

turn, Eliot's figuration of war duplicates the modernist
appropriation of history through formal strategies that
seek not so much to displace as to master, and in
mastering, to articulate its own authentic stance.

But

this "stance" of observation, if you will, is compromised
by the intersection of the narrative violence of history
and the violence of form, for the cutting through of the
boundaries between experience and form, of action and
observation, of history and poetry, which the figuration of
war allows, raises the question: when poetry attempts to
absorb the violent dislocations of history, will it succeed
in eradicating them, in transcending them, or will it
simply internalize them, thereby manifesting in its own
tangle of linguistic structures (as indeed the "Note" has
done) the very dislocations if sought to dissipate?
In 1921, after attending the London premiere of
Stravinsky's Le Sacre du Printemps, Eliot, echoing
Baudelaire's claim for the "heroism of modern life,"
praised Stravinsky's endeavor "to transform the rhythm of
the steppes into the scream of the motor horn, the rattle
of machinery, the grind of wheels, the beating of iron and
steel, the roar of the underground railway, and the other

barbaric cries of modern life; and to transform these
despairing noises into music"

("London Letter"

[Oct.] 452).

But what of the barbaric cries of total war that would make
two sweeps during Eliot's career?

Anything other than to

observe them first-hand would result in their being
transformed into a poetry resisting that "horrific
capability" of history James pointed to. In the poems
"Gerontion," The Waste Land, and Four Quartets, war does
not remain neatly pinned against the background wall of
context, delegated to act like Eliot's favorite ghost
behind the arras who menacingly moves forward when the back
is turned, only to disappear once again behind the arras
when confronted.

Rather, figures of war "break" into the

texts, exposing the antagonism between the poet's modernity
and the text that is history. The very presence of war does
not so much complicate this writing of modernity as to hold
it hostage to what it seeks to resist--that its very
resistance to history is itself a symptom of its own
complicity.
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CHAPTER TWO
"GERONTION": THE THEATRICS OF WAR

The voice of "Gerontion," a poem written during the
same year as the Treaty of Versailles, does not seem to
resist the "horrific capability" of history;

it embraces it

as fact, testifies to the incomprehensibility of historical
processes, weaving out of the context of the profound
psychological and physical shock of World War I a
lamentation that draws its sustenance from the drama of its
utterly defeated landscape. Its resistance, however,

is to

be found in the alliance of eloquence and defeat that
serves to displace the reality of war by a figural merging
of literary discourse and war.
in 1943, Yvor Winters described "Gerontion" as a
"portrait of an individual from whom grace has been
withdrawn, and who is dying of spiritual starvation while
remembering his past." Since then, most commentators have
read "Gerontion," despite its radical innovations in poetic
form, as a continuation of the tradition of the dramatic
monologue--in which a speaker or character speaks to the
reader, expressing a particular narrative theme--and much
energy has been spent in the search for historical and
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literary personages who may have inspired Eliot's creation.
A. C. Benson's Fitzgerald, Tennyson's Ulysses, the biblical
Samson, and even William Butler Yeats have all been
successfully argued for, but none more convincingly than
for the Henry Adams of Eliot's review of The Education,
written, enticingly enough, during the same period that
Eliot was at work on "Gerontion."
There Eliot attacked Adams as a product of the New
England mind,

in love with the operations of its doubt yet

bound by the demands of a conscience weakened by a
pervasive moral debility. Eliot says of Adams, whom he saw
bewildered yet captivated by skepticism,

"Wherever this

man stepped, the ground did not simply give way, it flew
into particles; towards the end of his life, he came across
the speculations of Poincare, and Science disappeared,
entirely.

He was seeking for education, with the wings of

a beautiful but ineffectual conscience beating in a vacuum
jar"

(362). So the cold and arid movement of Gerontion's

skepticism seems to generate the "fractured atoms," like
the wind that blows through the poem, withering everything
in its midst into the hollowness of despair. Like Gerontion
who casts his mind upon an impenetrable and treacherous
history searching for some order, Adams had attempted to
find answers in history, trying to find a unifying
principle that would generate some order out of what
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appeared to be a numbing chaos, an attempt that failed,
leaving him with "his historical neck broken, 11 his mind
waking "to find itself looking blankly into the void of
death"

(460) .

Adams's pessimism Eliot considered the effect of a
mind removed from experience, sterile in its
absorption:

self-

"It is probable that men ripen best through

experiences that are at once sensuous and intellectual;
certainly many men will admit that their keenest ideas have
come to them with the quality of a sense-perception; and
that their keenest sensuous experience has been 'as if the
body thought.'

There is nothing to indicate that Adams's

senses either flowered or fruited: he remains little Paul
Dombey asking questions"

(362).

In light of this remark,

Denis Donoghue reads Gerontion as "a fragmented figure in
whom ideas have long since lost connection with the
experience of smelling a rose; a figure spiritually
febrile, vain enough to think that history must be corrupt
and the world incomprehensible upon no better evidence than
that his spiritual anomie requires these notions"
150).

(Reading

Suffering from what Ronald Bush calls a "sensory

desiccation"

("I have lost my sight, smell, hearing, taste

and touch:/How should I use them for your closer
contact?"), Gerontion is a mind estranged from authentic
experience, isolated from the sensory world, on the one
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hand, divorced from " 'what we really are and feel, what we
really want, and what really excites our interests,' and,
on the other,

'the real world'"

(Bush 34).

Bush, comparing

him to Tennyson's Dlysses, writes that "Gerontion

presents

himself in a landscape transformed by his own isolation, a
psychological terrain where things he once loved have
cooled, diminished and turned into inconveniences"

(34) .

Because of his inability to make "contact" with
experience, Gerontion's words are empty,

"vacant shuttles

weaving the wind," and it is this emptiness of rhetoric,
unmoored from its proper object yet powerful in its
evocation and self-deception,

that seems clearly to be at

the heart of the poem's method, which has been described as
the construction of a theatre of words, built up by
Gerontion to compensate for his deprivation from reality.
The rich texture of allusion and pastiche owes its fabric
to the words of Newman and Tennyson, Joyce, Adams, and
■James, Tourneur, Chapman, Middleton, Jonson and
Shakespeare, Blake, Lancelot Andrewes, and Edward
Fitzgerald through A.C. Benson; yet it is the Jacobean
rhetoric that most supplies Gerontion with a w a y of
escaping his own inability to act or to experience the
"intelligence" of sense.
Eliot was, at the time, especially concerned with the
moral implications of Jacobean rhetoric,

specifically with

Senecan drama, that is, with its

ability to use verbal

artifice to displace reality and to deceive one into
confusing1 the gesture for action, the pose for moral value.
Senecan drama, with its emphasis on declamation rather than
on action and thus "at one remove from reality," is "all in
the word, and the word has no further reality behind it . .
. the centre of value is shifted from what the personage
says to the way in which he says it." In contrast,
drama,

in Greek

"behind the drama of words is the drama of action,

the timbre of voice and voice, the uplifted hand or tense
muscle, and the particular emotion. The spoken play, the
words which we read, are symbols . . . for the acted and
felt play, which is always the real thing"

("Seneca" 7).

Gerontion displays no such "unity of thought and
feeling, action and speculation"

embodied in Greek drama;

instead, he seems to be an expression of an ethic "which
supplied the lack of moral
attitudes and poses"

habits by a system of moral

("Seneca" 13).

So Gerontion's

laments, his grievances and his supplications, made up as
they are from the texture of Jacobean and Elizabethan
rhetoric, are a "matter of postures" that weave the wind,
seeking to fill the void.

Denis Donoghue sees this attempt

as a symptom of an egotism that "would issue in a selfregarding style,

for which the readiest examples are

available in Jacobean smoke and sulphur . . . Nearly any

smoke and sulphur would do, provided they provoked the
vaunting eloquence which works as a substitute for the
action it should accompany and define"
Donoghue, Gerontion,

(Reading 150).

For

"transfixed between a real action he

is not resolute enough to take and the vacant gesture that
mocks it"

(Reading 147), is a figure embodying Eliot's

"appalled sense . . . of the availability of words to
provide us with specious worlds in which we may take
refuge"

(Reading 156). And take refuge he seems to through

a process,

so curious to Eliot, of

self-dramatization--

when a character in a play becomes for a short moment aware
of himself as character, or as Eliot states in his essay
"Rhetoric and Poetic Drama," sees himself in a dramatic
light"

(27).

Eliot had Othello in mind and Othello's

ability in his last speech to take refuge in his own
dramatic efficacy, thus "cheering himself up" by "turning
himself into a pathetic figure, by adopting an aesthetic
rather than a moral attitude, dramatising himself against
his environment.

He takes in the spectator, but the human

motive is primarily to take in himself"
31).

("Shakespeare" 130-

Spectator in his own theatre of words, Gerontion,

through the force of his rhetoric, turns his impotence and
deprivation into the conditions for his moral significance.
The hero of his own insufficiency, his rhetoric is
sufficient to charm and move, to weave specificities of

52
gesture that, because aesthetic in nature, can provide him
with a gratification unavailable through action and genuine
feeling.

Yet the self-consciousness necessary for his "own
delectation" also provides an awareness of the inefficacy
of his method, and the last passages of the poem are most
often read as a failure of his role-playing to keep away
the void into which the puppet-like De Bailache, Fresca,
and Mrs. Cammel whirl--a vortex(t) in which the imaginary
ship of his thoughts becomes caught, driven into the small
corner reserved perhaps for the anonymous, most certainly
the small corner of his own "dull head" from where he
began, blowing into the husks of his own dry thoughts.
Thus, for many readers, Gerontion is both a bad poet
and a bad historian, for this most unreliable of unreliable
narrators embodies attitudes and methods censured by Eliot
in his essays. Essay after essay attacking the excesses of
rhetoric, the division of mind from experience and word
from sense, and the failure to construct unifying wholes
are assembled against the speaker of this poem. In his
inability to unify the present and the past, Gerontion is
considered both an "uncritical historian" and an "imperfect
critic"

(See Longenbach Modernist Poetics 189-93) .

inability to impose, as Eliot puts it,

His

"a credible order

upon ordinary reality . . . thereby eliciting some
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perception of an order in reality, to

bring us to a

condition of serenity, stillness, and

reconciliation" marks

him, for many readers, as a bad artist (OPP 94). But for
Gerontion to be this "imperfect critic" of his times, one
must assume a psychological and dramatic coherence,
minimizing the subversion of the dramatic monologue's
determinates of speaker, scene and narration.
The opening passage would seem to support a
tangibility of voice and scene:
Here I am, an old man in a dry month
Being read to by a boy, waiting for rain.
X was neither at the hot gates
Nor fought in the warm rain
Nor knee deep in the salt marsh, heaving a cutlass.
Bitten by flies, fought.
My house is a decayed house,
And the jew squats on the window sill, the owner,
Spawned in some estaminet of Antwerp,
Blistered in Brussels, patched and peeled in London.
The goat coughs at night in the field overhead;
Rocks, moss, stonecrop, iron, merds.
The woman keeps the kitchen, makes tea,
Sneezes at evening, poking the peevish gutter.
X an old man,
A dull head among windy spaces.
The easy conversational tone of the opening gives a
certain concreteness of scene, introduced by the solidness
of the "Here," opposing where he was not. So an old man
waiting for rain, being read to, meditates on the past, in
some proximity to a decayed house which harbors both a mean
domesticity and a servant who keeps the kitchen, while a
goat coughs outside and the slumlord leans on the window
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sill on a warm, dry night.

Such a summary, however, is

misleading, for the language contains strong, if
indefinite, allegorical potentialities that choke off any
such tangibility. The references to past wars, wrapped
within the context of dryness and decay, as well as the
linking of the contemporary commercial cities of Antwerp,
Brussels, and London to an anti-Semitic cultural diagnosis,
immediately conjure the recent war and its aftermath,
Europe in 1919--politically ruined, spiritually confused,
and growingly anti-Semitic, as indicated by the link
between the jew and the debased commercialism symbolized by
the capitals. The house is both the house of Europe and its
mind; it is both mind and grave. The goat coughs overhead
on a windy hill ("a windy knob") or as Capricorn, in
constellated regions of the sky, suggesting an astrological
disturbance in which rolls the catalogue of "Rocks, moss,
stonecrop, merds."

But disturbances here are grammatical.

Gabriel Pearson marks how the "swift aggressive flurry of
strong verbs" creates "an impression of inflicted
retaliations

. . . the 'Jew' placarded, as owner, on an

appositional sill, being spattered, degraded and mutilated"
("T. S. Eliot" 87).

Yet witness how the "blistered,"

"patched," and "peeled" can apply equally to the house or
to the jew, and indeed the tonal qualities of the language
here work beyond referential scope, achieving a "half

life," somewhere between image and reference. The strange,
cosmopolitan tableaux of the unidentified Mr. Silvero,
Hakagawa, Madame de Tornquist and Fraulein von Kulp takes
place not in the house of the opening scene but in some
obscure sinister past, where insomnia and cultural faux-pas
join the tryst and the seance to contribute to what Kenner
calls an "epiphany of guilty terror"

(Invisible 130).

Meaning here is primarily the effect of a language of
gesture: Erik Svarny notes that "phonetic and rhythmic
effects" of the "Jonsonian 'humorous' naming" serve "to
imply that t h e s e •individuals have no particular
significance beyond the rudimentary identity of the names
they bear"

<182).

Any potential narrative function that

they have is further arrested by the warp and weft of the
parallel participles "Who walked .../ bowing .../ Shifting
.../who turned," turned indeed into "Vacant Shuttles

[that]

weave the w i n d . "
By the end of the poem the scene will switch from
cogitations in a "draughty house" to a farcical explosion
of more "Jonsonian" characters whirling into the same
universe where constellated goats once coughed and
constellated bears now shudder, whirling above the sea,
both ocean and gulf, where the old man, both an unfit
mariner and gull, is driven by winds that are both warm

("the Trades") and cold ("feathers in the snow"), a
universe of cartographical nonsense.
The instability of scene could be meliorated by the
pattern of either a conversation or a meditation of a
character, but along with the confusion of physical and
mental landscapes, the speaker's dramatic coherence
deteriorates, and the organizing principle of the verse
paragraphs seems less a matter of a speaker's volition than
of a figurative logic carried by the allusive properties of
words, which seem to achieve an independent life of their
own. Thus the anonymous Jacobean rhetoric that intrudes in
the sixth verse paragraph--for example,
Think at last
I have not made this show purposelessly
And it is not by any concitation
Of the backward devils.
I would meet you upon this honestly.
I that was near your heart was removed therefrom
To lose beauty in terror, terror in inquisition
--serves to distance and depersonalize, disconnecting the
line between voice and speaker. So too the declarative
sense of the lines on history is more a matter of rhythm
than reference, for the rhythmic waves of sententiousness
punctuated by Think's that can either hold the
deliberateness of the imperative mood or be in the
indicative, serve to undercut, if not obliterate, both a
grammatical and a thinking subject. The disintegration of
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the speaker into a multiplicity of verbal modes alerts us
to the possibility that there is no real character here, no
one with a determinate personal history. Hugh Kenner calls
Gerontion an "auditory illusion within the confines of
which the components of the poem circulate and co-exist"
(Invisible 125).

Any sense of personal coherence is for

Kenner the result of "the uniquely specifying rhythms, the
richly explicit verbs, the syntactic muscularity of a
sequence of declarative sentences," which "expend
themselves in weaving the wind, their intimate narrative
energy handling any ambiguities, phantoms, footless
metaphors"

(Invisible 127). He further insists that “the

sense of personal presence can at any moment be resolved
into a purely technical management of stresses and
caesurae"

(Invisible 125).

And more recently, John

Riquelme has argued that the heterogeneity of the language
counters any impression of personal voice that the opening
introduces, for “The grammatical indeterminacy disturbs the
statements' coherence in ways that resist resolution"
(157).

Regardless,

it is difficult to give up the notion

of a voice or a consciousness here. The “I" beckons toward
us, simultaneously confessional and haughty; like the "I"
of a medieval riddle, if gestures toward the allegorical
plane, though frustrating any resolution into such
stability.

Accordingly,

Riquelme notes the allegorical
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tendency:

"The language pertains not to a character whose

name indicates that he is a person but to one who is named
artificially.

Like a figure in a medieval allegory whose

name points to a concept that is abstract and general
rather than personal and individual, Gerontion is not a
person but one among many possible incarnations of the
meaning of his name in Greek,

k i t t l e old man'"

(157).

To be nothing more than an etymology, however,

is to

be a great deal. Serving as the title for a poem whose
context is a war which effectively ended a phase of Western
culture, whose "voice" typifies historical consciousness,
and whose method, in its echoes of literary history,
appears to embody historical remembrance itself, Gerontion
seems to personify the mind of a culture; hence the
customary suggestion that Gerontion implies the "Mind of
Europe" or historical consciousness itself (which Nietzsche
said was "a form of congenital grayheadedness"). The phrase
"the Mind of Europe" was of course greatly utilized by the
modernists. One such text, Paul Valery's "Letter from
France: The Spiritual Crisis," not only represents the
phrase's usefulness to its period but because of striking
similarities both in terms of subject and exposition may
just well be a major source for Eliot's poem and if so, may
justify the allegorical insinuations of Gerontion as some
aspect of the "Mind of Europe."

At the request of John Middleton Murry, Paul Valery
wrote the essay to be published first in English in two
parts for the Athenaeum. The first part, which bears more
directly upon Eliot's “Gerontion," was published on April
11, 1919 and given Eliot's close relation with the journal,
he may have read it shortly before or even upon
commencement of the writing of the poem. There is indeed
the similar complaint that can be found in so many
contemporary works dealing with the war and its meaning -the disillusionment with the myth of social evolution, the
uncertainty about culture, and the accompanying fear of
history being only a malign destiny. Yet there are
correspondences of image and detail that seem to point to
something more than just a shared milieu.
Valery begins his diagnosis of a European “crisis of
mind" by first addressing the extraordinary realization:
that Western culture may not be inherently privileged, but
both the product and victim of “accident." Europe is
figured as a great ship driven by the storms of war, soon
to go down into history, here a deep sea-grave that already
holds within its "obscure depths," the “phantoms of great
ships laden with riches and intellect," other civilizations
that now remind that "the abyss of history is deep enough
to hold us all.

. . . The circumstances that could send the

works of Keats and Baudelaire to join the works of Menander
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are no longer inconceivable; they are in the newspapers.

.

. . The most formidable and the best ordered can perish by
accident"

(182).

Besides the fragility of culture, the

war, according to Valery, disclosed the fraudulent claim of
high culture to act as an unbroken continuum of
intellectual power providing for increasing moral and
material progress.

The roles of the arts, sciences, and

technology, as well as accepted moral categories, are
neither civilizing nor edifying but instrumental in the
slaughter that has taken place:
The great virtues of the German people have begotten
more evils, than idleness ever bred vices. With our
own eyes, we have seen conscientious labor, the most
solid learning, the most serious discipline and
application adapted to appalling ends.
So many horrors could not have been possible
without so many virtues.
Doubtless, much science was
needed to kill so many, to waste so much property,
annihilate so many cities in so short a time; but
moral qualities in like number were also needed. Are
Knowledge and Duty,then, suspect? (182)
Complementing the deadly possibilities of knowledge are the
contradictions inherent in the "innumerable ways of
thought, dogmas, philosophies, heterogenous ideals" that
the European "mind" embraces in a desperate attempt to
maintain "consciousness":
While inventors were feverishly searching their
imaginations and the annals of former wars for the
means of doing away with barbed wire, of outwitting
submarines or paralyzing the flight of airplanes, her
soul was intoning at the same time all the
incantations it ever knew, and giving serious
consideration to the most bizarre prophecies; she
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sought refuge, guidance, consolation throughout the
whole register of her memories, past acts, and
ancestral attitudes. Such are the known effects of
anxiety, the disordered behavior of a mind fleeing
from reality to nightmare and from nightmare back to
reality, terrified, like a rat caught in a trap. (182)
The source of disorder goes beyond the war to the
intellectual disorder of modernity, which is "the free
existence,

in all her cultivated minds, of the most

dissimilar ideas, the most contradictory principles of life
and learning."

Consequently, beneath the detail of the

age, Valery laments,

"I see . . . nothingi Nothing ... and

yet an infinitely potential nothing."
Abandoning the feminine persona and not surprisingly
the accompanying motif of hysteria, Valery changes figures:
now the mind, no longer disordered but keenly analytic, is
"an intellectual Hamlet" observing the terrain of European
history with a "terribly lucid mind":
Standing, now, on an immense sort of terrace of
Elsinore that stretches from Basel to Cologne,
bordered by the sands of Nieuport, the marshes of the
Somme, the limestone of Champagne, the granites of
Alsace ...our Hamlet of Europe is watching millions of
ghosts." (183)
This terrace lies over the circumference of World War I's
theatre, but the ghosts are not the ghosts of men, but the
ghosts of "the subjects of our controversies...all the
titles of our fame,

the weight of all the discoveries and

varieties of knowledge."

Caught between "the tedium of
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rehearsing the past and the folly of always trying to
innovate, 11 this Hamlet picks up skulls of those celebrated
by history for their ideas, the great thinkers whose
contributions form a chain stretching into the present
devastation. And although the war is over, peace harbors
more terrors than war, for

peace is the condition in

"which the natural hostility between men is manifested in
creation... a time of creative rivalry and the battle of
production," which in turn will precede another "dark
passage" into war.

The (Question remains,

"Have I not

exhausted my desire for radical experiment, indulged too
much in cunning compounds?"

(183)

Apropos of compounds, and at the risk of appearing
obvious, one will of course note the resemblance between
Valery's ship driven by a storm down into history and
Gerontion's imaginary thought boat "driven by the Trades/
To a sleepy corner." Moreover, the seemingly aberrant
couplings of virtues breeding vices and horrors breeding
virtues recalls Gerontion's

Unnatural vices
Are fathered by our heroism. Virtues
Are forced upon us by our impudent crimes.
And Valery's question,

"Are Knowledge and Duty then

suspect?", shares with Gerontion's "After such Knowledge,
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what forgiveness?"

the sad tone of the irrevocable, the

reaching of some border which, when passed, shuts one off
from the repose of certainty.
for certainty,

And so follows the demand

in "Gerontion" the insistent demand for

signs, portents, and wonders ("Signs are taken for
wonders") and in Valery's Europe, the groundswell of
disordered incantations and bizarre prophecies.
It is, however, the presentation of the mind of Europe
as

observer, overwhelmed by the shock of war, overlooking

his rutted "body" of history that reminds one most of
Gerontion, another observer removed from history yet
witness to it who,

like Valery's Hamlet, seems doomed to a

historical remembrance provoked by guilt. Valery's portrait
of European culture as a disordered mind split into
cognitive and physiological functions resembles Eliot's
depiction in his essays of modern European or English
history as a "splitting up of personality."

Both Valery

and Eliot tended to impose psychological patterns on
cultural and historical phenomena, and it was Eliot who
personified Europe or England as a collective consciousness
that, although once a "unified sensibility" exhibiting a
healthy fusion of the experiential and the cognitive, had
in the modern age "split," thought and word becoming
dissociated from feeling (a term that Eliot always
associated with the physiological): "in the seventeenth
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century a dissociation of sensibility set in, from which we
have never recovered"
eighteenth century,

("Metaphysical" 64). Prior to the

"the intellect was immediately at the

tips of the senses;11 consequently, the poetry of the time
presented a "direct sensuous apprehension of thought, or
recreation of thought into feeling," unlike the poetry of
Tennyson and Browning who "do not feel their thought as
immediately as the odour of a rose"

("Metaphysical" 64).

Valery's "mind of Europe" is split along the
conventional gender lines of male rationality and female
emotionalism. Before the passage on Hamlet as the intellect
of Europe, Europe is figured as a female in the throes of
hysteria:
An extraordinary shudder ran through the marrow of
Europe.
She felt in every nucleus of her mind that
she was no longer the same, that she was no longer
herself, that she was about to lose consciousness,
a consciousness acquired through centuries of bearable
calamities.
Later, the analytic intellect speaks as Hamlet, a
conventional figure for the vitality of intellect at the
expense of action, and begins his "lucid" analysis of the
past. In "Gerontion,11 Eliot will present a sensibility
dissociated along the lines of mind and body, the female
relegated to act in another conventional role, to figure
the enigmatic power of History, a bewitching if deadly
Clio. Gerontion,

"a dull head,11 separated from the physical
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springs of sensibility, observes, like Hamlet, commanding
his mind to cogitate ("Think...think"), to seize the past
within some design that will speak a human truth; yet it is
a tired mind, fighting its own hebetude, overwhelmed, like
the female Europe, by imminent senselessness (in both
senses of the word), fighting the insensate darkness

(he

is blind) by means of a jumbled memory.
Like Valery, who perceived the war as the ultimate
physical expression of a disordered cultural mind, Eliot
consistently pointed to war as the political manifestation
of this "dissociation of sensibility. 11

In his discussions

of English poetry, it is the English Civil War that
functions as the historical marker for the "splitting up of
personality." And the American Civil War, a war he called
"the greatest disaster in the whole of American history,"
constituted the political expression of the cultural
schizophrenia Eliot saw working in the American
sensibility.

The Treaty of Versailles, which ended World

War I, a treaty Eliot, like many around him, condemned as
dangerously flawed, marked the culmination of "the process
of disintegration"

(Notes 45). And,

in 1929, when asked how

the collapse of Western culture would manifest itself,
Eliot's blunt response was "Internecine warfare.

. . People

killing one another in the streets” (qtd. in Spender 120).

There is a final resemblance between these two
observers. Valery's Hamlet questions the "cunning
compounds" of scientific knowledge and political thought
that have led to the "fatal precision" of culture necessary
for the occurrence of the First World War.

Gerontion

searches out the "cunning passages" of the historian's
text,

"passages" that, along with "corridors" and "issues,"

suggest the image of a labyrinth, and, given the textual
pun on passages, it is a textual labyrinth held in a mind-a mind which we have already seen as the House of Europe
and which has its own edificial connotations.

The phrase

"cunning passages" figurally merges text and brain, sexual
power and knowledge, a merging to which we can also add
war, for as there are passages in texts and passages in
houses and craniums, there are also "passages at arms."
These passages are transfigured into "a wilderness of
mirrors," which has evoked in some readers the construction
or "contrivance" of the Treaty of Versailles in the Hall of
Mirrors.

We can also note Henri Bergson's definition of

memory as "the moving mirror which continually reflects
perception as a memory"

(165) and Shelley's definition of

poets' minds as "the mirrors of futurity." But here the
mirrors seem shattered, their shards reflecting a
wilderness that seems to contain both the political and the
poetic. But we need not hurry to the heart of the poem to
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attend to the figural merging of war and word, for this
merging occurs, albeit more indirectly, at the very opening
of the poem, where war, the physical expression of the
cultural suicide that has resulted in the despairing milieu
of the poem, paradoxically becomes a trope for that from
which Gerontion is dissociated, from experience and
volition, and meaningful historical participation.
Gerontion opens his deliberations with memories of
past wars, memories that identify the recent war as the
motivating force behind his ruminations and that begin his
search of the p a s t :
Here I am an old man in a dry month
Being read to by a boy, waiting for rain.
I was neither at the hot gates
Nor fought in the warm rain
Nor knee deep in the salt marsh, heaving a
cutlass,
Bitten by flies, fought.
Although we may not be sure of where exactly Gerontion is,
we can be, however, relatively certain of where he has not
been: not at Thermopylae (of which the "hot gates” is a
transliteration); not in "warm rain" and "knee-deep in the
salt marsh,11 which suggests the swampiness of the Somme and
Ypres Salient and

which recall Pound's image of trench

warfare ("walked eye-deep in hell"); and not clearing vague
jungles,

"heaving a cutlass" and "bitten by flies," like

some seventeenth-century explorer or adventurer.

Most critics have read these lines as evidence of
Gerontion's cowardice, of his distance from "real"
experience. The lines are structured around negatives that
maintain the speaker's absence and nonparticipation, a
distance that certainly effects a tone of regret and
complaint; hence, the "Here" is derisive and contrasts with
the wistful "there" implied by the neither/nor
construction. The references to past wars
vitality and prowess,

evoke heroism,

qualities that contrast with the

abstractedness and powerlessness of the speaker. For
Gregory Jay, the allusions to battles, especially the
heroism of the Greek defeat at Thermopylae,

serve as

evidence of Gerontion's distance from "historically
meaningful action"

(24).

Elizabeth Drew reads "the warm

rain" as a positive image connected to Thermopylae,

"an

active struggle of civilization against barbarians,
refreshed,

in spite of hardships, by the 'warm rain' of

faith in a common cause"

(50). For Grover Smith, the "warm

rain" represents a "vital energy," like that of the "tropic
luxuriance of jungles in which" Gerontion has not fought
(64).

And Robert Crawford points to the fear of inanity,

of the horror of a "Death in Life" and the accompanying
desire for "experience to fill the emptiness" that the
lines illustrate (51).
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Besides establishing Gerontion's separation from
"action" and "experience," the lines, for many of the
poem's readers, serve as evidence of Gerontion's use of
rhetoric to compensate for his deprivation.

The emphatic

negatives and their insistence on absence are countermanded
by a syntax and diction that in their vigor supply an
imaginative participation that real history has denied him.
For example, in the lines
Nor knee-deep in the salt marsh, heaving a cutlass
Bitten by flies, fought
the verb fought is radically separated from the "Nor" that
defines it, a separation comprised of one adverbial and two
participial phrases, which, replete with their caesuras,
not to mention the final verb itself, emphasize and linger
over actions never performed by the speaker in a place he
never was.

The two b's and two f_'s of the last line

punctuate the sleight-of-hand.
There is general agreement, then, that a rhetorical
performance is used to compensate for the speaker's
declared separation from a "vital" world of experience that
participation in history would have given him. The
references to past wars

are there because they connote the

benefits of active engagement in history:

"heroic action,"

"vital energy," and "historically meaningful action"--all
of which Gerontion has been denied. There is, however, a
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problem with this line of thought:

To associate history

with the benefits of meaningful participation and to
associate Gerontion's rhetoric'with the consolations of
style is circular because the vitality accruing to history
in this context has only so accrued because of Gerontion's
grand rhetoric itself, which invests past wars with an
exoticism and heroic appeal not so much present in the
experience of war as in traditional representations of war.
The "vital energy" of warm rain in a poem may inspire faith
but in a fly-infested marsh or jungle inspires malarial
fever, in the trenches of the Somme, foot-rot, and at
Passchendaele,
mud.

(for thousands) the opportunity to drown in

And the reality of being cut down at Thermopylae ma y

have lacked the thrill of dying bravely at the rhetorically
heated "hot gates."

The lines are not so much references

to past wars but rather references to the literary record
cultural memory k e e p s .
History in the opening lines is not the arena of
"meaningful action” from which Gerontion is absent;

rather,

it is, in its etymological sense of "story," the textual
record of exemplary deeds transmitted through the romance
of the chronicler, who more often than not invests the
remote past with a glory that indicts the sordidness of the
present. Gerontion, here,

is not so much the chronicler as

he is a listener and surveyor of the texts of history. We
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do not know what the boy reads to Gerontion, but read he
does, maybe of "The old music of bygone singers, rich
haunting sentences of old leisurely authors" that "rang" in
the brain of Edward Fitzgerald, whose biography by A. C.
Benson stands as a source for the opening two lines1. Just
as that old music came "unbidden" to Fitzgerald's pen, the
old music of war comes unbidden to Gerontion, who begins to
weave his text from the past made out of words. That is how
the past survives in Gerontion's mind: not in deeds but in
words.
This may explain the peculiar effect of the images of
war of the opening lines--the opposing forces of absence
and presence, of being not there yet there.

The lines, as

Robert Crawford has shown, echo those of another speaker,
also removed from the heroics of war, the speaker in James
Thompson's poem,

"Memoir," who complains

1 fret 'neath gnat-stings, an ignoble prey
While others with a sword-hilt in their grasp
Have warm rich blood to feed their latest gasp
(qtd. in Crawford 50).
But the striking element of Eliot's lines is the
positioning of the speaker relative to these wars. While in
1
Benson, describing the elderly FitzGerald, wrote:
"Here he sits, in a dry month, old and blind, being read to
by a country boy, longing for rain.
FitzGerald's mind was
like the magic isle--'Full of noises,/ Sounds and sweet airs
that give delight and hurt not.'
The old music of bygone
singers, rich haunting sentences of old leisurely authors,
rang in his brain, and came unbidden to his pen" (141-142) .
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Thompson's lines the separation of the speaker from
military adventure is clear, in Eliot's lines the speaker
is ambiguously both there and here.
On the one hand, the "I was neither" clause denotes
distance, but it also establishes a pre-existence, that
Gerontion's consciousness is as old as the events where he
was not. Indeed, like the Tiresias of The Waste Land, who,
if not for Pound's surgical skill, would have been another
incarnation of Gerontion, Gerontion has, as Harvey Gross
puts it, "total recall; he was witness to the birth of
Christ and he is spectator at the downfall of the W e s t .
His personality merges with historical figures and with
characters from the history of literature.

He speaks with

the words of Edward Fitzgerald, the blind translator of the
Rubaiyat, or in the iambic rhetoric of the Jacobean
tragedians"

(34) .

Yet we are told that he was not there,

never experienced the quixotic gestes that his memory
evokes.
To be not there yet there. Is this not the bitter
effect of memory, both psychological and cultural, which
Plutarch described as "the hearing of deaf actions, and the
seeing of blind?" The mind can hold the past within its
consciousness, vicariously enjoy its plot yet be helpless
before the enchantment of its discourse and its
irrevocability. Gerontion, like Othello, sees himself in a
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dramatic light, doubling as both spectator and actor,
because, as in a dream, he holds a past within his
consciousness that weaves a sentence he cannot control,
cannot suspend. The substitution of the epigraph from
Shakespeare's Measure for Measure for the original Dante
epigraph tells us much about where Eliot wanted to put
emphasis.
Ronald Bush tells us of a canceled epigraph of an
early typescript: "Come '1 mio corpo stea/nel mondo su,
nulla scienza porto" ("How my body stands in the world
above, I have no knowledge").

The line is from Dante's

Inferno XXXIII, where Fra Alberigo explains that because he
betrayed his guests, his soul was delivered to hell,
leaving his living body to move about on earth. A perfect
epigraph for the desiccated figure of Gerontion,
head."

“a dull

But the epigraph from Measure for Measure changes

the emphasis from complete division of mind and body to an
emphasis on the dreamer, who does not experience division
but d6doub1ement (to use a word of which Eliot was fond),
one self becoming two, the dreamer dreaming and the dreamer
dreamt:

"Thou hast nor youth nor age/ But as it were an

after dinner sleep dreaming of both." The lines are spoken
by the Duke in Measure for Measure, who, disguised as a
humble friar, counsels a young man facing execution to
disinvest himself of the world, to look at life
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disinterestedly, such as in a dream in which youth and age,
the past and the future, the beginning and the end, are
held by the disinterested eguipoise of one with eyes on
heaven and immortality rather than on this mutable world.
The austerity of the Duke's godly but cold oratory is
comically meliorated by the audience's knowledge that at
any moment,

like Christ, who comes back like a "thief in

the night," the Duke can shed his disguise, resume his
abandoned office as magistrate, and dispense a merciful
justice.
In "Gerontion," the execution has already taken place
in the form of World War I, and the intercession of justice
means the wrath of Christ, whose imminent return hangs in
the poem as an eschaton:

"The tiger springs in the new

year/us he devours." indeed, apocalyptic imagery haunts the
poem. The winds that blow through the poem lead to the
disintegration of the cosmopolis, where, as Gross
describes,

"Through an Einsteinian metamorphosis these

people are changed from mass to energy, their scattered
substance blown by the cold winds of space"

(41).

Nature

and history hurtle further and further into chaos and,
ultimately,

into "fractured atoms," just as the second law

of thermodynamics and Pearson's kinetic theory of gas
indicated--two theories which led to Henry Adams' own
apocalyptic vision.

Gerontion's "dream" is not then the drowsy contentment
of the after-dinner sleep but a fitful delirium of thought
in which "youth and age," the past and present coalesce
into an eschatological nightmare that closes into the mind.
In a way, the violent end of history that Gerontion fears
has already occurred since there is no longer any room for
action or deed; the narrative stream of history remains
suspended within the mind as memory repeats the forms by
which humankind has attempted to order and thus understand
history--history as Herodotian record of epic deeds, as
nature's cyclical pattern of birth and death, and history
as teleological process, moving toward some purposeful, or
blind, end.

All are part of the wind that weaves the

vacant shuttles.

In this poem, the winds of history that

drive Gerontion's boat are also the winds of a discourse
disengaged from its proper object, almost as if once
history has ended it can only remain in the words of the
past, now vestiges that the words of the present can only
trace, the dead Word's faint emanations:

"The word within a

word, unable to speak a word,/Swaddled with darkness."
Lancelot Andrewes' description of Verbum lnfans--"The Word
without a word; the aeternall Word not hable to speake a
word"

(85)--is transformed into the absent center at the

heart of language, verbal dissociations parallel cultural
and psychic ones.
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Although the images of war in the opening lines
suggest a concrete action or a "reality" of historical deed
denied the inactive speaker, they are no more than a
function of Gerontion's rhetoric, a rhetoric not present
because of compensation, that is, because of an
individual's withdrawal from a reality or from history, but
because reality itself has withdrawn from language.

Like a

dreamer dreaming, Gerontion is transfixed between a passive
spectatorship and the dreamt stage of history upon which he
never moved, because it was never really there, or if
there, there only in the form of figures and masks of
language, that, given present conditions, mock the present.
Gerontion has no ghosts, ghosts which for Eliot and
Valery, as well as for Ezra Pound, represented the living
presence of tradition and history. In Valery's essay,
Kamlet is haunted by "millions of ghosts." in Three Cantos,
Pound writes,

“Ghosts move about me/ Patched with

histories." But for Gerontion, there are no ghosts, only
the bodies of texts that form the body of History, the
alluring body of a guileful woman:
History has many cunning passages, contrived corridors
And issues, deceives with whispering ambitions.
Guides us by vanities. Think now
She gives when our attention is distracted
And what she gives, gives with such supple confusions
That the giving famishes the craving.
Gives too late
What's not believed in, or if still believed,
In memory only, reconsidered passion.

The drive to understand history, the desire to find the
center of History's labyrinth is described in sexual terms
and the failure in terms of the impotence and unfulfilled
cravings of epistemophilic endeavors, a carnality which
extends into the corrupt atmosphere of Jacobean intrigue
suggested by the imagery. History plays the conventional
courtesan suitable to the conspiracies of palace galleries,
to the whispers of the ambitious and the self-serving who
populate the violent corridors of Jacobean revenge tragedy.
Corridors of history can also be actual corridors-such as the Polish corridor "contrived" by the Treaty of
Versailles--and, as such, blend the conspiracy of palace
politics with the geographical carvings World War I
effected. And there is another corridor that comes to mind,
the corridor that Valery alludes to in reporting the
peripheral points of Hamlet's terrace: the war corridor of
the trenches, which stretched from Belgium to Switzerland.
Although we think of the trenches as making up one
continuous, seamless line, they were, like History's
labyrinth, actually maze-like, made up of 25,000 miles of
complex corridors, linked by communication traverses, that
zig-zagged, forcing the soldiers to turn and twist their
way through the lines (Fussell 42).

Circuitously moving at

night and stumbling over unknown objects in the deadlittered neutral ground between enemy trenches was much

like weaving one's way through a dark maze. As T. E. Hulme
said in his diary, the neutral ground was "practically
never seen by anyone in the daylight . . . it's full of
dead things, dead animals here & there, dead unburied
animals,

skeletons of horses destroyed by shell fire.

It's

curious to think of it later on in the

war, when it will

again be

seen in the daylight"

Movement through the

dark was

"always in the same direction" and over "definite

(167).

p a t h s ." Hulme reported one of these paths "led right over
the chest of a dead peasant (Belgian)"

(169).

In 1915,

after a conversation with Hulme, Ezra Pound recreated
H u l m e 's wartime experience, writing in a poem.
To and fro, from the lines.
Men walk as on Picadilly,
Making paths in the dark
lines which concluded with
My mind is a corridor. The minds about me are
corridors.
Nothing suggests itself. There is nothing to do but
keep o n .
(qtd. in Longenbach Cottage 125)
If not but for the resoluteness of the last sentence, these
lines could have been spoken by Gerontion, whose labyrinth
of history fuses, as we have seen, cerebral arenas with
political and military ones.
Yet, although the vertiginous allusiveness of the
language in "Gerontion" holds the contemporaneity of the
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War in its textures, the words resist referential
engagement with it; indeed, any referential engagement that
they have seems anchored, at the expense of the modern
context,

in the world of Jacobean revenge drama.

Stephen

Spender recognizes the suitable correspondence between the
"decadence, violence, intrigues, villainy and deviousness
of the Jacobean world of corridors and mirrors" to the
Europe of the Treaty of Versailles; but Spender has
challenged this parallel as being one inadequately
constructed and insufficiently illuminating. First, he
argues that Eliot allows himself to be carried away by the
Jacobean analogy so thoroughly that "the parallel of the
post-Elizabethan disillusionment, with its haunted decayed
poetry, takes over the poem" (63). Second, he argues that,
even if the Jacobean method had been suitably restrained,
there is another problem:
If the second half of "Gerontion" doesn't really
convince on the levels of imagination or of
intellectual argument, this is because the attempt to
draw a parallel between Jacobean plays about political
intrigues at small Italian courts and the situation of
Europe at the time of the signing of the Treaty of
Versailles doesn't work. The modern political theme,
which affects the whole world, is being forced through
too narrow a channel. The sinister backstairs postElizabethan atmosphere is hypnotic rather than
illuminating.
Critics have suggested that “contrived
corridors" and, some lines later, "a wilderness of
mirrors" are images suggested by the intrigues of the
peacemakers in 1918 in the Versailles Hall of Mirrors
to establish a "Polish corridor."
If this is so, it
seems less silly to say that the Polish corridor and
the Versailles mirrors put a Jacobean poetic thought
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in Eliot's head than that the pastiche Jacobean poetry
significantly evokes the Europe of Clemenceau and
Lloyd George (64-65).
To argue that the Jacobean world is an unsuitable analogy
for the modern context is to assume, even demand, an
intentional neatness of boundaries between tenor and
vehicle that does not apply here or to much of Eliot's
poetry.

Furthermore, Eliot does not need to restrain "the

haunted, decayed" poetic effects because the logic of the
passage lies not in the drawing of a parallel between past
and modern contexts but in allowing the "hypnotic" to
overwhelm the "illuminating" to such an extent that the
constructive impulse of the poetry is foregrounded at the
expense of the subject, however morally compelling. The
engagement with the Jacobean world is more a matter of
engaging with the voluptuous eloquence of Elizabethan and
Jacobean blank verse, with its exploitation of the figural
and tonal resources of words, and its construction of a
"theatre of words" rather than it is an engaging with the
visual properties of its subject.

Analogical lines here

do not link "worlds"--Tourneur's stage evoking the Europe
of 1919--as much as they link the "method" or poetic
strategies of Elizabethan and Jacobean verse drama with the
nature of Gerontion's voice and mind--a voice that, as we
have seen, enacts and is enacted by what Giles Gunn would
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call "scriptable and iconographical forms, 11 and a mind that
as Mind of Europe is mesmerized by the aesthetic force of
such forms.
Eliot's censure of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century
verse drama masked, though not very well, great admiration
and recognition of its influence on his poetry. Its
enchantment with the incantatory potential of language and
its gluttony for the sensational were problematic
tendencies that Eliot found in his own verse. Hugh Kenner
first

argued

that "Gerontion" was an exercise in purgation

for Eliot, exploiting as it does the poetic tradition that
began with the Elizabethans and culminated in the poetry of
Swinburne (which Eliot attacked as a poetry of
"hallucination”), a tradition that Kenner defines as
presenting a "world in which poetic effects are inclined to
glide succulently down among words, looking like sleep,
proffering the reader a strong toil of grace; in which the
poet more or less consciously capitalizes on the abundance
in English, of words which, like 'toil' and 'grace,'
incorporate barely differentiated the force of verb, noun,
and adjective simultaneously, and so discourage a sentence
from going unambiguously about its business"

(invisible

135). The power of Elizabethan and Jacobean verse drama
lies, for Kenner, in its ability to "transfigure the
visible," to turn the drabness of its stage and the paucity
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of its theatrical effects into an aural feast for the mind.
In keeping with Eliot's critique of the ability of such a
use of words to remove one from experience, in their tonal
and figural potential to create artificial worlds and
artificial feelings, Kenner thus presents "Gerontion" as

a

"theatre of words", a "wilderness of glass" cut like the
"aphrodisiac glasses" of Sir Epicure Mammon, which are
Cut in more subtle angles to disperse
And multiply my image as I walk
Naked between my succubae;
The connections between the Hall of Mirrors and aphrodisiac
glasses (and, for that matter, Bergson's moving mirrors of
memory and Shelley's "mirrors of futurity") are not as
tenuous as may first appear.
The moral complication of Jacobean rhetoric, for
Eliot, involved more than words creating artificial worlds
and artificial feelings, removing their listeners from the
"real world of experience." Its pathology also lay in the
ability of words to enclose the violent, the corrupt, or
the barbaric within their forms, making their contents an
"affair of pungent sauces" palatable to the aesthetic
taste.

Eliot's attack on the Elizabethans for their

morbidity, their disillusionment, and their lack of a moral
"system" always involved the accompanying attack on their
"sensationalism" and their "artistic greediness, their
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desire for every sort of effect together*'

("Dramatists"

116-17).
This troubling entanglement of eloquence and
corruption parallels the entanglement of war and word in
"Gerontion,"

where the "cunning passages" of the Mind of

Europe are disordered narratives of desire and power which
formally enclose the violence of historical content.
Renouncing the force of history as a force linked to
political and moral conflict (much like Valery's Hamlet),
Gerontion embraces defeat and physical dissolution,

seeking

in the closure of history, through the stance of
spectatorship, a marginalization and thus an exclusion from
its barbarities.

Valery's Hamlet is isolated from

culpability by his reputed faint-heartedness, Gerontion by
his nonparticipation in battle. Because Gerontion is but a
cipher of history, his attempt to separate himself from
history, his attempt to be an observer of it, can only be
done by doubling, as we have seen, into nonparticipant and
combatant,

spectator and actor, dreamer and dream,

cogitating mind and the concupiscent body of history;

yet

this detachment is compromised by a rhetoric whose
brilliance lies in a ventriloquism that throws the
violations of history into its textures, exciting "the
membrane," holding the mind captive to the drama of its own
drama, its own theatre of war.

CHAPTER THREE
THE WASTE L A N D ; WAR AND THE DISCOURSE OF QUOTATION

"We can only say that it appears likely that poets in
our civilization, as it exists at present, must be
d i f f i c u l t . Our civilization comprehends great variety
and complexity, and this variety and complexity,
playing upon a refined sensibility, must produce
various and complex results. The poet must become more
and more comprehensive, more allusive, more indirect,
in order to force, to dislocate if necessary, language
into his meaning." (248 SB)
Throughout his essays, Eliot consistently argued for
the existence of an indelible connection between literary
practice and its social context, although the exact nature
of such a relation is unclear.

The above statement,

for

example, would seem to set matters straight by its relating
formal to social complexity, yet the statement moves
simultaneously in two directions:
allusiveness,

(1) Comprehensiveness,

and indirection force a dislocation of

language so as to accurately reflect and thus participate
in a culture that can only understand its own complex
idiom; or (2) because of the determinations of this p r e 
existing idiom on both personality and medium,
must move through it, dislocating,
formal violence to capture meaning,

the poet

forcing, effecting a
"his meaning," not

necessarily one articulated by his culture and thereby
84
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possibly reactive and resistant. Therefore, formal method
both reflects and transcends external complexities.
Of course, it is The Waste Land, along perhaps with
the Cantos and Mauberley, which came to be seen and,
despite (or perhaps because of) its domestication and with
its teeth pulled, continues to be seen as the model example
of an experiment in the adeguation of form to modernity, an
experiment which continues to elicit controversy over the
relation between its formal and its socio-political
discontinuities.

The form of Eliot's attempt "to force"

and "to dislocate" the language to reflect and yet resist
the

historical violence of the war and the resulting

cultural disintegration is anamorphic because its
discontinuities actualize cultural disorders and at the
same time serve as a strategy to transcend those disorders
through the search for a new kind of patterning.
And readers have indeed taken up the search. As James
Knapp observes, most readings of the poem have directly
argued or assumed that "the necessary dislocations of
poetic language not only mirror the present state of
civilization but reflect the poet's urgent need to
intervene, through a choice of significant form, in the
apparent disorders of history"

(39).

And, again, most

readings point to irony as the method by which the very
symptoms of the cultural disease are used to transcend the
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disease--a kind of homeopathic poetics. Thus,

in these

readings the statement "These fragments I have shored
against m y ruins" indicates the poet's attempt to redeem
the apparent ruins of a culture's tradition by recomposing
its broken forms into organic unities that will resist
outside chaos. So, in this view, his "heap of broken
images," reminiscent of Gerontion's "wilderness of glass,"
becomes in the poem's last section rubble from which the
poet sorts fragments, as Jonathan Bishop describes,

"like

some king after a defeat, to assemble fragments of that
tradition which amounts for him to an equivalent of a
scattered demesne"

(172).

Early commentators,

following the poet's lead, have

sorted rubble for the soundings of unities that recompose
the broken forms--narrative unities

(e.g., Grail legends,

fertility myths, double-sexed, blind prophets) all
faithfully supplied in accordance with the Notes'
directions, or organic ones,

like Joseph Frank's argument

for a spatial logic that subsumes any temporal structure.
War,

in these readings,

is consistently read as a

historical counterpart to, if not cause of, the conditions
of the waste land--whether those conditions be linguistic
indeterminacy, cultural chaos, or psychological
fragmentation--and so stands outside of the normal cultural
production of signs as a wolf at the door.

This assumes

that war is a phenomenon that works outside of culture,
generating a violence that both creates the possibility of
culture yet allows for its destruction.

As Tadusz Slawek

has pointed out, this distancing of war from culture leads
in humanist discourse to the "paradox of fragile cultural
values surrounded by a thick stratum of phenomena
threatening but, at the same time, formative to those
values." So he argues that war, in this view, stands in
"dangerously dialectical opposition" to culture, for it
precedes culture, standing outside of it as a formlessness
that periodically bursts through, leveling and privileging
(309) .

To write poetry in the waste land is to rebuild,

again, the destroyed cultural house, absorbing
discontinuities, which, as Knapp states, may be terrifying
in society but "become, when reenacted as art, the means to
perceive a new order impervious to anything outside itself"
(40) .
But perceiving this new order has been problematic,
for the heterogeneous text invites multiple meanings and
readings, a multiplicity accelerated by the publication of
The Waste Land's manuscripts. Complicating the established
boundaries of interpretation, the manuscripts served as
evidence that The Waste Land was the product not only of a
"shoring" but also a "storing" up of miscellaneous work
going back as far as 1914, years before Eliot knew of

Jessie Weston's work or before he had read Frazer.
discovery

The

of these manuscripts led to a new awareness of

the complexity of Eliot's addition of the Notes. Before the
publication of the manuscripts, Eliot's pronouncements on
the centrality of Tiresias' consciousness and on the
structural importance of the romance narrative to the poem
had supplied early readers with a framework to arrange the
dissonant relations of its fragments.

However, the early

draft, titled "He Do the Police in Different Voices," took
attention away from such mythic narratives, since it showed
that if there were any primary plan, Eliot was thinking
more in terms of writing an urban satire in the tradition
of Pope, Dryden and Dickens.

Moreover, the exact extent,

if not the intent, of Ezra Pound's editing was made
apparent and complicated affairs since the fabric of the
text now included the presence of more than one hand (and
if we count Vivien Eliot's, then the presence of more than
two) .
With the publication of Eliot's dissertation and the
recent accessibility of his student papers and notebooks, a
new appreciation of how far Eliot anticipated many
assumptions and concerns of current literary theory has led
readers of The waste Land away from seeking "to recuperate"
the poem's ostensible incoherence toward studying the way
the poem enacts its own provisionality, manifesting and yet
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displacing meanings that seem drawn from that mysterious
plane Eliot described both in the earlier and later stages
of bis career: the "indefinite extent, 11 a space of
adventure and failure,

"the frontiers of consciousness

beyond which words fail, yet meanings still exist"

(OPP 22-

23) .
The most recent work on Eliot has emphasized the
importance of this issue of the credibility or contingency
of language in The Waste Land.

Harriet Davidson reads the

poem as a phenomenological investigation of absence,
Jonathan Bishop as a formal articulation of the guestion of
linguistic credibility, William Harmon and Denis Donoghue,
the conflict between the inarticulate noise and the
logocentric Word, and most recently, John Paul Riguelme who
argues that "In The Waste Land, Eliot evokes writing7s
potential for undermining voice and self by using styles of
speaking and even apparently lyrical language in ways that
involve disfiguration and the loss of speech and that
reveal the poem's written, constructed, rather than spoken,
spontaneous character"

(181).

The way that the poem

foregrounds this "constructiveness," its "written-ness,"
calls attention to hermeneutic processes involving the
reader in the textual process itself--duplicating our
search to decipher what always remains in part an
indecipherable world.

The poem has been called an "unstable" or "incomplete"
allegory about writing poetry in the wasteland of
modernity--most fittingly because The Waste Land can be
read as modern allegory or, to use Angus Fletcher's phrase,
a "decapitated allegory," meaning that, although retaining
the figurative gestures of allegory, the poem is
dispossessed of a vital, culturally approved system of
reference, a transcendent origin or paradigm which it longs
for, and its fragmentary form can be read as a succession
of attempts to generate and to reach the stability of such
a paradigm. In The Waste Land, we can find this succession
of attempts not in the juxtaposition of static, discrete
fragments that refuse to cohere, but in the stratagem of
citation, which Jonathan Bishop persuasively argues is the
essential form of the poem--a poem whose

intertextual

enigmas, produced through the citation of multiple
discourses both linguistic and extra-linguistic, draw its
readers into its own interrogation of language.
The urgency of the poem's interrogation of language
arises out of a historical situation which has disclosed
the nature of war to be not a formless opposite of culture,
precedent to its formation, but a product of and thus a
form of culture, which in turn generates new cultural
signs, or as Slawek puts it, "turns signs of the
constructive into signs of the destructive," depriving
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other cultural signs of their "innocence," revealing that
formal violence is not completely separate from other forms
of culturally engendered violence (309) .

Throughout The

Waste La n d , the grounds for the expected opposition between
war and poetry erode by means of the subterfuge of
citation, which in its shattering of the continuum of
tradition and its discourses and in the resulting
proliferation of voices, tongues, and provisional contexts
exposes a vision whose horrors defy the power of language.
The contextual interpenetration of war and literary
construction, which citation provides, exposes at least one
of these horrors: the intimate relations, antagonistic yet
collusive, between cultural iniquities and art.
Eliot's use of citation, as has often been noted, took
a revolutionary form, radicalizing what had traditionally
been a conservative mode.

According to George Steiner,

allusion, or quotation, and its close cousins of parody and
pastiche,
poetry,

invoked, during much of the course of Western

"the fully declared but unsaid codes and presences"

of a culture of "civility," a canon formed and generated by
the interplay of Christian and classical lines, which "very
largely generated and organized the shapes of western
public speech and personal identity among the educated"
(Difficulty 7-8).

Citation, drawing on this canon of

shared value and reference, served to authorize, as well as

to elucidate (seemingly), the poem making use of it.

Erik

Svarny states that, innocent of Eliot's procedures of
"abortive classicism," the neo-classical poet, for example,
would have used quotation to clarify his meaning, mediating
between audience and poem in an attempt "to restrict his
sources to a consistent range of material which in theory
at least, would be shared and respected by the poet and his
educated public (the individual poet counterpointing his
gifts against a traditional frame of reference)"

(162).

Eliot's use of citation, however, serves to ironize,
on multiple levels, tradition's relation to his poem, for
while his elaborate citations draw an oftentimes
distracting attention to literary history, which would seem
to elevate its authority and importance, they only serve to
testify to its failure. Tradition itself appears exploded
info shards and traces of past, now alien, value, like the
cities "Burst[ing] in the violet air" of "What the Thunder
Said." Indeed, the most obvious link between the experience
of war and the poem lies in the poem's vision of tradition
as an inherited order that has been left in ruins, a vision
which accounts for the strong sense of elegy in the poem.
Steiner, pointing to the importance of elegy to modernism,
writes,

"The archival energies of Joyce, of Eliot, of

Pound, the many-layered structures of allusion which
characterize their work, are a ceremony of mourning for
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resources once naturally accessible to writer and reader in
the contract of culture"

(9).

In response to this sense of elegy in the poem, we may
read the poem,

if we like, as the poet's attempt to

reconstruct tradition,

to re-invent literary history, by

reconciling what has become dispersed and thus disparate
material into an order achieved through a private aesthetic
standard. Although citation may even more easily uphold
tradition than subvert it, matters in The Waste Land are
more complicated because, as (Jonathan Bishop has
demonstrated, Eliot's "discourse by quotation" refers not
only to past literary works but extends to the "re
collecting" of past experience, real or imaginary, private
or dramatic, as in the fragmented narratives of "The Game
of Chess" and "The Fire Sermon" and even to the citation of
extra-linguistic discourses.

The cockney chat of the pub

and the soldier's song concerning Mrs. Porter function,
according to Bishop, as citations of the "unconscious
rhythms of popular speech," "a communal analogue to the
recollection of traditional verses"

(157).

The recalling

of the conversation in the Hofgarten and of the Hyacinth
girl is a "psychic quotation" from some private,

individual

past, which when verbally "recollected" seems to elude full
presentation,
distance.

remaining fragmentary and enigmatic in its

They are, according to Bishop,

"the private

analogue to fragments from other poems11 (157).

And then

there are the incomplete narratives, the unfinished tales
of the unhappy upper-class husband and wife, the
conversation at the Pub, and Tiresias' vision of the typist
and the "carbuncular" clerk. Because of their fragmentary
structure and the disembodied qualities of the speakers,
they seem to be cited from other sources, and Bishop
reminds us of that peculiar quality of Eliot's dramatism,
that "he is inclined rather to listen to, almost to
'quote,' the words of others than to put them clearly on
stage"

(162).

At the same time, but in contrast to the

talk of the poem, the recollected language of poems,
performance, and elegy, stands what William Harmon has
called the "idiom of the inarticulate"--music, noises,
babble, and "creaturely sounds." The "water-dripping song"
of the hermit thrush is cited as a literal "Drip, drop,"
the "inviolable voice" of the nightingale as a "Jug JUg," a
"Twit Twit Tereu," the cock's annunciation, rich in
religious symbolism,

incarnated into 11co co rico, " and

Wagnerian lyric translated as "Weialala leia."
This juxtaposition and interplay of multiple
discourses

reveal just how far quotation has lost its

usual ancillary role. Here, it overwhelms the expected
expository or narrative continuum of the text, overwhelming
even the coherence of the poet's voice.

The opposition,
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set up by Eliot's note on Tiresias and by the poem's
original title, between a unifying voice and a diversity of
voices does not ease the difficulty of tracing the
relationship between quoted voices and the "unifying
consciousness" of the poet. When so much seems quoted, the
multiplication of voice turns the poet himself into a
cubist-like face of intersecting quotations. But more than
ventriloquist, a popular figure given the original title,
the poet plays collector, assembling from ruined memorials
of private and cultural codes a collection as capricious as
any private collection.
As regards the poem's method of quotation, there is,
on the one hand, a struggle to build up a destroyed
cultural inheritance, the quoted fragments being signs of
its defeated history and the babble of multiple discourses
being a sign of the impossibility of reaching the
sustenance of antecedent contexts through the exhausted
resources of language; on the other hand, however,
quotation does violence to the force of tradition,
juxtaposing miscellaneous textures from past and present
discourse as a means of subverting the order of
tradition.

The figure of the collector is therefore

relevant because his activity, as Walter Benjamin
recognized, both preserves and destroys the past. Despite
acute ideological differences between Eliot and Benjamin,
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Benjamin's treatment of quotation and the collector figure
is enormously helpful to understanding Eliot's poetic
method in The

Waste Land2.

Benjamin's ideal text of history was a collection or,
as he called it, a "constellation" of "thought-fragments,"
juxtaposed (quotations from miscellaneous sources that,
instead of serving to elucidate the author's running
commentary, would replace it as well as the author,

the

(quotations speaking for themselves through their
"collision" with each other {(qtd. in Jennings 36).

Hannah

Arendt defines the method as one which consisted of
"tearing fragments out of their context and arranging them
afresh in such a way that they illustrated one another and
were able to prove their raison d'etre in a free-floating
state"

(47).

Analogous to the discoveries of modernist

form, Benjamin discovered the destructive power of the act
of (quotation, describing its power as arising not from "the
strength to preserve but to cleanse, to tear out of
context, to destroy" so as to "break the spell of
tradition" and to attack the "mindless peace of
complacency" of the present. Of his own use of the method,
he stated,

"Quotations in my works are like robbers by the

2Svarny has noted the applicability of Benjamin's figure
of the collector to Eliot's poetic method, but his comparison
points in a different direction than does m y analysis.
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roadside who make an armed attack and relieve an idler of
his convictions"

(gtd. in Arendt 38).

A fusion of Quotations torn from their original
contexts and then juxtaposed serves to rupture the
continuum of authoritative discourses, destroying the
pernicious placidity of the present by disclosing
dialectical truths undisturbed by the mediations of
traditional historical narratives, which Benjamin condemned
as suppressing true relations of past to present.

The

historian becomes, then, as the amateur collector who picks
or "carves" out of the historical context the precious bit,
the authentic nugget, exotic and interesting in its
momentary isolation from living system and its foreignness
to the present.

Destroying its original context, the

collector creates a new context when he sets it among his
other artifacts.

Although ostensibly preserving the past,

the collector shatters the work of tradition.

Whereas

tradition orders the past chronologically and
"systematically in that it separates the positive from the
negative, the orthodox from the heretical and ...[the]
obligatory and relevant from the mass of irrelevant or
merely interesting opinions and data," the collector's view
of the past, according to Arendt, is unsystematic because
his criterion is genuineness or significance,
that defies any systematic classification"

"something

(44).
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This power of the collector to destroy the causal and
systematic power of tradition upon the present and to
present a rival ordering of the past, for Benjamin, was a
fitting analogy for his work as historian, although the
imposition of the principle of montage upon history did not
mean to effect the arbitrariness of surrealism. Only
through the "constellation of images" gathered from past
and present, from both the detritus and the treasures of
culture, could the past speak to the present and in turn
could the present come to see its own face.
Benjamin's insistence on the destructive power of
quotation was, according to Arendt, strengthened by the
War, which confirmed that the past, perceived as a bearer
of tradition, was no longer "transmissible" but "citable."
For Benjamin,

"the figure of the collector . . . could

assume such eminently modern features . . . because history
itself.

. . had already relieved him of this task of

destruction and he only needed to bend down, as it were, to
select his precious fragments from the pile of debris"
(45).

And what history did not "ruin," the collector

would; Benjamin writes that "he reduces what exists to
ruins, not in order to create ruins, but in order to find
the way that leads through them"

(qtd. in Frisby 109). Here

is the same paradox that we find in Eliot's own
"constellation of images": history's "citability" is both a
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trope for its disintegration and a stratagem of formal
violence upon its forms.
In The Waste Land, ruination, whether effected by the
violence of history or by the violence of the poet or
collector's hand, offers the opportunity to form a fusion
of the past and the present, of public and private
contexts,

intersecting planes of reference that release

their meaning through the act of reading.

Michael Levenson

points out that it is important to remember that "the poem
is not, as is common to say, built upon the juxtaposition
of fragments: it is built out of their interpenetration"
(190) .

Interpenetration, yes, but not integration: the

contexts from which the fragments originate cannot be
erased, thereby always creating tensions that themselves
generate ever new meanings.

If the original contexts are

literary, they draw the interpreter down through parallel
configurations; if they are private or unknown, they leave
a void that gives the fragment a seemingly greater
significance. The fragments, too, converge with their new
contexts, forming new meanings as they work with and
against each other. And yet, as Eliot himself makes clear
in "Tradition and the Individual Talent," the new context
cannot help but be altered by the alterior ones.

The

result, as Riquelme points out, is that the "multiple
linkages" keep the reader in motion not only laterally, as
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parts connect with and echo other parts, but also
vertically, through stratifications of other texts and
contexts, since "there are as many paths forward and back
for the reader to follow, as well as paths to and fro
between them, and paths in and out of them"

(166) .

Of one path, that leads directly from the Stetson
passage at the end of "The Burial of the Dead" to the last
lines of "What the Thunder Said," Riquelme has pointed out
the strategic placement and significance.
Unreal City,
Under the brown fog of a winter dawn,
A crowd flowed over London Bridge, so many,
I had not thought death had undone so many.
Sighs, short and infrequent, were exhaled.
And each man fixed his eyes before his feet.
Flowed up the hill and down King William Street,
To where Saint Mary Woolnoth kept the hours
With a dead sound on the final stroke of nine.
There I saw one I knew, and stopped him, crying
"Stetson!
"You who were with me in the ships at Mylae!
"That corpse you planted last year in your garden,
"Has it begun to sprout? Will it bloom this year?
"Or has the sudden frost disturbed its bed?
"Oh keep the Dog far hence, that's friend to men,
“Or with his nails he'll dig it up again!
"You! hypocrite lecteur! -- mon semblable, -- mon
frere!"

I sat upon the shore
Fishing, with the arid plain behind me
Shall I at least set my lands in order?
London Bridge is falling down falling down falling
down

101
Poi s'ascose nel foco che gli affina
Quando fiam ceu chelidon--Q swallow swallow
I>e Prince d'Aquitaine a la tour abolie
These fragments X have shored against my ruins
Why then lie fit you. Hieronymo's mad againe.
Datta. Dayadhvam. Damyata.
Shantih shantih shantih

In these two passages, the radical discourse of
quotation, as we have defined it, plays its part
transparently. Both moments of the poem bring together the
greatest diversity of style and context, each stanza
beginning a narrative that disintegrates into a collage of
quotations, and if there are in the poem, as many readers
have traced, crises of psychological fragmentation, here
they become acute. In the Stetson passage, obscure pronouns
complicate boundaries between speakers and listeners, even
between readers and speakers, to such a degree that voice,
Riquelme continues,

seems merely a matter of textual

repetition, and in the last lines, the "I" disintegrates
into strands of literary quotations, a final
voice, which,
madness.

collapse of

for many readers, expresses the speaker's

Moreover,

the last lines of the poem itself are

linked to the Stetson passage by the repetition of "Unreal
City" in "What the Thunder Said," a link further
strengthened by other repetitions, enough to say that the
latter passage cites the former: London resurfaces, as do
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English Renaissance drama (through quotation) and the
apostrophic "O", all held in a suspension of quotations
from foreign literatures.

More significant to the

argument, however, is the centrality of the two passages to
the issue of war and poetry, because being the points at
which the catabolic and generative properties of
"citability" are most acute, they plot the intersection of
the opposing contexts of war and poetry.
The Stetson passage is the first in the poem where
past and present intersect through textual repetition,
where modernity is crossed by that which has been, forming
what Benjamin called the "synchronic moment," i.e., "when
that which has been and the Mow come together in a flash as
a constellation"

(qtd. in Jennings 36).

It is of course

the speaker's sudden cry to Stetson and his reference to
Mylae and thus to the Punic Wars that dislocate time and
space, bringing together post-War London to fourth-century
post-War Rome, but it is first through Baudelaire and Dante
that London becomes as a palimpsest,

"unreal," a

description not only of its moral hollowness but also of
its spectral transparency that allows for the perception of
its layers.
As the Notes tell us, the opening lines from
Baudelaire's "Les Septs Vieillards" lie beneath the opening
words "Unreal City": "Foilrmi 11 ante cit6, cit6 pleine de
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rdves/ Ou le spectre, en plein jour, raccroche le passanti"
In Baudelaire's poem, the speaker wanders along city
streets through a yellow fog and is confronted, one by one,
by seven decrepit men, more apparitions than human who form
a "cortege infernal."

Two passages from

Dante's Inferno

are combined to form the lines "I had not thought death had
undone so many./Sighs,

short and infrequent, were exhaled,/

And each man fixed his eyes before his feet."

In Canto III

of Dante's Inferno, entering the Vestibule of Hell where
the souls of the spiritually torpid are located, Dante sees
a crowd gathered behind a banner:

"e dietro le venia si

lunga tratta/ di gente, ch'i' non averei creduto/ che morte
tanta n'avesse disf&tta."
long a file of people,

[Behind that banner trailed so

I should never have believed that

death could have unmade so many souls].

And in Canto IV,

where the souls of the unbaptized forever wait in Limbo,
the first circle of Hell, sighs arise from the crowds,
"Quivi, secondo che per ascoltare,/ non avea pianto mai che
di sospiri/ che l'aura etterna facevan tremare."

[Here, for

as much as hearing could discover, there was no outcry
louder than the sighs/ that caused the everlasting air to
tremble]. In 1950, Eliot remarked that he had used Dante
here "to establish a relationship between the medieval
inferno and modern life"

(qtd. in Svarny 208).
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The references to Dante and Baudelaire, as well as the
later reference to Mylae, transform London itself into what
Kenner has called "a jumbled quotation"

("Urban" 37).

Post-war London lies over Baudelaire's Paris, over Ancient
Rome and over Dante's underworld city of suffering like a
stacked Troy. But perhaps an analogy of layering is
inappropriate, for the image of a buried past lying
labyrinthine below the present, connotes a simultaneity and
a unity of time, that although perfectly appropriate to the
theme of the passage, distort the passage's structural
complexity.
Although Jewel Spears Brooker and Joseph Bentley limit
their view of the Unreal City to the intersection of
Dante's Dis with 1922 London, they provide two useful
analogies to explain how the passage presents past and
present frames: photographic double exposure and the
oscillation of cursive and recursive images (such as the
well-known picture of a vase which at a different moment
can be a picture of two faces in profile facing each
other).

The city is both real and unreal, for as "In a

photograph, this scene would be a double exposure, two
cities that have the overlapping and the faceted
arrangements of cubism . . .

As with the case of the

concave convex alternation in optical illusions the two
scenes cannot be perceived simultaneously and their
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oscillation cannot be stopped"

(83) .

Thus, just as when we

look at cursive and recursive images, our attention
oscillates from London of the '20s to the Vestibule of
Hell, and although we may try to fix the double-image of
London into a single image, we "will be unable to unify and
stabilize the doubleness" because "regardless of how
arduously that mind works to make them coexist in a single
moment,

they will always remain a sequence in time"

(83,

85) .
Yet, our inability to integrate perfectly a metaphor
does not mean that, as 3rooker and Bentley argue,
city image is established as central"

(83).

"neither

I would argue

that the contemporary image is ultimately central,

albeit

not necessarily always focused. The very specificity of
actual street and church names, of London Bridge, and of
the sound of the nine o'clock bell, harbinger of the daily
return of London's commuters, does not allow us to stray
very far from the contemporary, however shot through with
other "exposures." If, upon a holographic turn, we see
Dante's spectral city for a moment

(once the citation has

been made clear), or think of Baudelaire's "swarming"
crowds or even of Roman adventurers,

it is always to the

London street that we return. The convergence and
divergence of other images or cities is what effects and
defines the experience of modernity itself, that is, a
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perception,

in Eliot's words,

"not only of the pastness of

the past, but of its presence."
Convergence is easy: both in Dante's infernal city and
in Eliot's doomed London, a crowd--in one case physically
dead,

in another spiritually dead--passes a spectator,

whether flaneur or pilgrim, who greets one of the crowd in
a shock of sudden recognition.

But this double exposure of

twentieth-century locale and medieval spectacle is framed
by direct and indirect quotation of Baudelaire,
appropriately enough because of Baudelaire's position as
one of the "moderns" who, like Poe before him in the
important "The Man of the Crowd," recognized early the
historical novelty and significance of the modern urban
crowd.
As a collectivity of mass that moved and changed, the
crowd offered Baudelaire a paradigm of modernity and, as
such, an occasion for la modernity. For Baudelaire, the
artist as flaneur experiences "an immense joy to set up
house in the heart of the multitude, amid the ebb and flow
of movement,

in the midst of the fugitive and the

infinite"; the crowd,

"an immense reservoir of electrical

energy" is "a magical society of dreams."

The artist in

the crowd becomes "a mirror as vast as the crowd itself"
reflecting "the crowd's multiplicity of life and the
flickering grace of all the elements of life"

(9-10) .

In Eliot's hands, however, the "dense and continuous
tides of population, 11 "the tumultuous sea of human heads"
(Poe 388-89) that Poe's convalescent-spectator rides, is a
human river of white-collar workers on their way to
London's financial district, moving at nine o'clock as
Eliot (himself "a superior bank clerk") did every morning,
from Southwark to London Bridge and then onto King William
Street where the Bank of England and other financial
institutions stood. Unlike Baudelaire'3 phantasmagoric
crowd with its "multiplicity of life," this human river is
starkly monochromatic, homogeneous, and regimented, less
lively than even Dante's dead souls. It moves as if
involuntarily; even its utterance, the "sighs, short and
infrequent," seems more mechanical than expressive. In
Dante, the sighs of the damned, however horrible, make the
air tremble with their pathos; here they only punctuate an
awful silence that has even muffled the sound of the
Church's bell, whose sound is "dead."
The involuntariness and unpredictability of the modern
crowd which fascinated Baudelaire are replaced by a
paralytic repetitiveness, which we can read, given the
crowd's make-up and destination, as Eliot's comment on the
dehumanization of the modern urbanite whom he had
envisioned in an early draft as an insect, part of the
"swarming life" of London, who "Vibrates unconscious to its
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formal destiny,/Knowing neither how to think, nor how to
f eel/...burrowing in brick and stone and steeli11 In this
rejected section, the "observing eye," like Baudelaire's
flaneur, records "the motions of these pavement toys,"
motions which in the Stetson passage are so mechanical that
one critic has compared the crowd to marching wooden
soldiers (Schwarz 115).
The figure may be more than whimsical,

for Donald

Childs, in a fairly recent article, has established a
connection between the name Stetson and the Anzac troops,
Australian and New Zealand soldiers, who, famous for their
heroic exploits at Gallipoli in the Dardanelles Campaign
(the invasion during which Eliot's friend Jean Verdenal
died), were ubiquitous throughout London, especially after
1916 when massive numbers of Anzac troops were transferred
through London from the Near East to France.
Stetson, one of the commuters, has been identified by
most readers as a twentieth-century Everyman, an ordinary
clerk,

indistinct from the crowd about him, following his

routine.

Call him Jones, Smith or Stetson, no matter.

Cleanth Brooks, for example, comments that "the name
'Stetson' I take to have no ulterior significance.

It is

merely an ordinary name such as might be borne by the
friend one might see in a crowd in a great city"

(93).

Refuting the speculation that Stetson is Ezra Pound,
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Valerie Eliot confirmed Stetson's perfect prosaicness:
"'Stetson' is not Ezra Pound.

Eliot said he was not

referring to anyone in particular, but simply meant any
superior bank clerk: a person in a bowler hat, black
jacket, and striped trousers.
in mind he replied:

To a suggestion he had Pound

'My friend does not dress like that,

and he would look rather out of place in King William
Street!'"

<qtd. in Childs 131).

Affirming that Pound with his Bohemian dress would be
an illogical referent for the name "Stetson," Childs
nevertheless wonders whether it is "not also the case that
bank clerks in general are not adequate referents for the
name in question unless, like Stetson, they are found not
only in King William Street but also on 'ships at Mylae'
and unless,

like Stetson again, they not only dress in a

certain way and have gardens and dogs, but also have
gardens with corpses in them--corpses that dogs want to dig
up"

(131).

Therefore, Stetson must be more than a bank

clerk just as the crowd flowing over London Bridge is more
than the crowd of commuters one would see on any weekday
morning in 1922.
Robert Crawford's discovery of Stetson's relation to
the bank clerk Charlie Mears (a character in Rudyard
Kipling's short story "The Finest Story in the World" who
remembers past lives as an Egyptian galley slave and a
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Viking seaman) would explain the abrupt transition from the
modern to the ancient here. Kipling's description of the
clerk's Quandary certainly lies behind The Waste Land's
Tiresias:

“The plastic mind of the bank-clerk had been

overlaid, coloured, and distorted by that which he had
read, and the result as delivered was a confused tangle of
other voices most like the mutter and hum through a City
telephone in the busiest part of the day"

(gtd. in Crawford

86-7) .
Still the question remains, wh y the name “Stetson11?
Childs,

reminding the reader of Eliot's fascination and his

taking great care with names, maintains that “Stetson,“ a
peculiar choice of name to represent the ordinary,
metonym for the Anzac soldier.

is a

Although in America the

word "Stetson" was a common synonym for the cowboy hat--the
ten-gallon hat manufactured and popularized by John
Batterson Stetson--in Britain it was, as Childs documents,
commonly associated with the large slouch hat worn by the
Anzac soldier.
Eliot,

like anyone else living in London during the

war, would have been familiar with the sight of the Stetson
hat. By 1916, when London was full of these soldiers,

they

had acquired almost celebrity status due to their
extraordinary heroism at Gallipoli.

On April 25, 1916, to

celbrate the Anzac contribution before the troops left for
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Australia and New Zealand, a much larger parade was held,
one made up of 5,000 Anzac troops.

Childs reminds us that

this parade through London's financial district included as
part of its route both The Waste Land's King William Street
and Cornhill Street, where at 17 Cornhill stood the offices
of the Colonial and Foreign Department of Lloyd's Bank, one
of which belonged to Eliot: "Given the parade route, and
given the disruption to the business in the area caused by
it, there is every chance that Eliot knew of it or watched
it himsel£--recalling Gallipoli and Verdenal, and
associating them thereafter with the famous Australian
slouch hat"

(145).

The metonymic "Stetson" and the reference to a
military campaign by a fellow comrade-in-arms justify
developing a third exposure of military troops marching
over the bridge and into the heart of London.

The phrase

"death had undone so many" becomes literal, especially when
we consider the disaster that was the Dardanelles Campaign,
during which, on May 2, 1915, Eliot's friend Jean Verdenal
would die, in Eliot's words,

"to be mixed with the mud of

Gallipoli"

The two grand parades in

(Criterion 452).

London that marked the opening and closing of the campaign
could not disguise the waste of human life: of the 400,000
British troops engaged, 200,000 were casualties; the French
suffered an even greater percentage of casualties,

losing
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more than half of their 79,000 soldiers.

After eight

months, the Allies were forced to retreat, having gained
nothing.
It should be noted, however, that although the speaker
may call out to an Anzac soldier, he speaks not of a modern
but of an ancient war.

Instead of to Gallipoli, we move to

the Battle of Mylae, which ended the First Punic War in 260
B.C.

But, as many critics have noted, the incongruity is

logical.

The First World War was regarded as essentially

the final military expression of a protracted economic
battle between two commercial and political empires.

So

too were the Punic Wars, fought by two trade rivals for
supremacy of the Mediterranean.

In addition, both wars

ended in settlements that defined peace as the interval
between wars.

Frustrated by Carthage's endurance, Rome

ended any possibility of its enemy's restoration by
destroying the city of Carthage, massacring its people,
salting the land in and around the city, and in a final
forbiddance of any human habitation, dedicating the site of
the razed city to the infernal gods--thus coining the
phrase "a Carthagenian Peace," a peace established by the
utter destruction of one's enemy.
The phrase would appear again in 1919 during the
drafting of the Treaty of Versailles, when, as Eleanor Cook
reminds us, “the argument for declaring the third war
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against Carthage (repeated again and again by Cato the
Censor, with his famous refrain Carthago delenda eat) was
the argument at the center of the controversy over the
peace treaties: whether the reviving prosperity of a
defeated trade rival could become a danger to the victor."
The Treaty's extreme, punitive terms triggered a raging
criticism, none so impassioned as that of John Maynard
Keynes, who in his resignation as representative and in his
subsequent best-selling book The Economic Consequences of
Peace (1919) would attack the Treaty as a "Carthagenian
Peace."

Keynes warned of one sinister consequence of such

a peace, that the treaty's harsh conditions would
eventually not only oppress the defeated but also the
victors themselves.

He warned that the Allies invited

"their own destruction also, being so deeply and
inextricably intertwined with their victims by hidden
psychic and economic bonds.

. . . If we aim deliberately at

the impoverishment of Central Europe,

. . . nothing can

then delay for very long that final civil war . . . which
will destroy, whoever is victor, the civilization and
progress of our generation"

(qtd. in Cook 350-351).

In his

work supervising the repayment of German pre-war debts for
Lloyd's, Eliot himself was quite familiar with what he
called the "knotty points" of the Peace Treaty, that
"appalling document"

(Letters 368). Keynes's argument, with
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which Eliot, according to both Cook and Christopher Ricks,
was familiar, paralleled Eliot's and other contemporaries'
diagnosis of impending cultural doom.

Cook, who traces the

influence of Keynes on The Waste L a n d , observes,
of 1922,

"in a poem

to introduce the battle of l&ylae where the reader

expects a reference to a World War I battle is to raise
chilling questions"

(350).

To make parallels between Rome and London was
certainly a national habit, but as Cook points out, only
rarely at the turn of the century "did they serve to set a
guestion mark againsc the enterprise of empire itself"
(350) .

In The Waste L a n d , they do: the transfigurations of

a bank clerk into an Anzac soldier, Roman seaman, and
underworld inhabitant trace the relations of empire, war,
and death.
Brooks,

Although one might be tempted,

like Cleanth

to draw from these relations the conclusion that

"all wars are one war; all experience one experience"
or John T. Mayer's variation,

(93)

"all wars are one war, all

cities one city, all times one time for those bound upon
the wheel"

(271), we must be careful that, after

recognizing the historical parallel between Rome and
London, we do not then just universalize the relationship
and thereby erase the specific historical context, what
Svarny has described as "the spectral atmosphere of p o s t 
war london,

in which the guilt, shock, and primarily
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incomprehension of a traumatized society is manifested and
translated through a sequence of historical, cultural, and
psychic dislocations"

(163).

To universalize the relationship would also erase the
feeling of radical dislocation begun by the speaker's cry
to Stetson, a cry that will ramble from Roman and
Carthagenian ships to buried corpses, about to sprout and
bloom, to gardens disturbed, to sinister digging dogs, and
to hypocrite readers.

To minimalize this dislocation,

to

normalize the text, we can, if we wish, and as some have,
turn Stetson the bank clerk into a horticulturist with a
taste for murder and literature or as several critics do,
even construct a personal history and a belief system for
him, so we can then read the entire passage opened and
closed by quotation marks as the utterance of one speaker,
the poet, albeit a bit hysterical or lunatic. But this
would be to gloss over the passage's strangeness, a
strangeness compounded by the instability of voice, despite
the presence of direct quotation marks.
dialogue,

as Kenner has assumed?

is this a

If not,

if it is the

speech of only one character (as most readers affirm), who
is this "I" of the Unreal City section?

Certainly not

Madame Sosostris, the referent of the previous "I". If it
is the voice, who reports her divinations,

is it replaced

in the "Unreal City" passage by another voice, another
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"observing eye," another voice on Charlie M e ars' crossed
phone-line connections? Is the first "you" addressed to
Stetson the same "you" of the corpse or the

"You!" of

which Baudelaire's reader is an appositive?

Stetson

himself is a presence more figurative than real, whose
"chief characteristic," according to Denis Donoghue,

"is

that he does not answer, though he instigates, the
questions addressed to him.

Stetson is the name of the

interrogation . . . he is an oracle who stirs a nervous
quiver of interrogation, and dies out in a line from
Baudelaire"

(188-89).

If the interrogation itself "dies

out" in the last line, then the interrogator's voice seems
extinguished by the heavy allusiveness of its own speech.
What begins as quoted speech of one speaker to an
identified listener reverts into the discourse of
quotation, so moving from language as speech to language as
text, constructed from the echoes and actual shards of past
texts. The corpse in the garden stirs memories of other
corpses, such as the corpse under Blake's "A Poison Tree"
and Dignam's corpse in Ulysses, regarding which Leopold
Bloom says, "Plant him and have done with him"

(231).

Planted in an English garden, not unlike a lilac or
hyacinth bulb, Eliot's corpse resembles

the victim of a

British murderer who, according to Kenner,

"unlike his

American counterpart, who in a vast land instinctively puts
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distance between himself and the corpse prefers to keep it
near at hand; in the garden, or behind the wainscotting"
(162).

In a poem whose original title came from a Dickens'

novel about body-robbing and murder along the Thames and
which opens from the perspective of the buried dead, this
corpse is one of many that surface, evidence to Kenner and
Gregory Jay that the poem hides a story of murder, of the
type popularized by the "low crime" press, a type of which
Eliot was exceedingly fond.
This potentially sprouting and blooming corpse is
also the dead god Osiris, whose annual consolidation and
rebirth bring life to the dead land, and is The Golden
Bough's ritual figure of the fertility cult,

the corn-

effigy which buried in the

the spring to

check its sprouting.

fall is dug up in

The abrupt, hurried rhythm of the

three questions --"Has it begun to sprout? Will it bloom
this year?/"Or has the sudden frost disturbed its bed?"-suggests more than idle curiosity as regards the health of
an acquaintance's garden. They suggest anxiety about the
expected "blooming" of the

corpse in a

place where rebirth

means not regeneration but

the revivification of private

and cultural memories that, having lost their restorative
power, return to disturb the mind, just as the dead return
from their beds to haunt the living. And to return means.
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given the implied concealment of a crime, to discover some
awful truth, some secret guilt shared by accomplices.
What do, in fact, "sprout" are words--not from a human
corpse, but a dead author's literary corpus. The next two
lines,

"Oh keep the Dog far hence, that's friend to men,/

Or with his nails he'll dig it up again!," as the Notes
tell us, indirectly quote lines from John Webster's The
White Devil ("But keep the wolf far hence, that's foe to
man/For with his nails he'll dig them up again.11) Changing
Webster's wolf to a dog allows Eliot to play with the
possibilities of the dog as symbol. Eliot's capitalization
of Dog alludes, as many have noted, to Sirius, the Dog
Star, which, although a friend to navigators, symbolized
the coming of war, sterility and death. In the Aeneid,
Sirius lays waste to the lands around Troy, bringing
drought and pestilence.

To the ancients, the dog was a

scavenger, a symbol of feral energies, corruption, and
death yet later would acquire a more genial reputation as
"man's best friend," a symbol of loving fidelity and
domesticity. Like the dog in Joyce's Ulysses, who with his
"rag of wolf's tongue redpanting from his jaws" looks "for
something lost in a past life,11 "vulturing the dead, "
Eliot's dog disturbs the corpse, uncovering that which it
is hoped will remain buried and secret, whether a past
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murder or a past murderous to the tranquility of
forgetfulness.
Like Webster's other wolf, who, in The Duchess of
Malfi, seeks to scrape up the corpse,

"Not to devour the

corpse, but to discover/The horrid murder," the reader
digs, encouraged by indirect citation and by the
intricacies of allusion,

but before he or she can scrape

along too deeply, seeking the corpse in the corpus,
line "You! hypocrite lecteur! -- mon 3embable,

the

-- mon

frere!" discovers him within the text, shattering the
conventional boundaries between readers and texts, thus
shattering the illusion that the passage is spoken rather
than written. The quotation marks now indicate both the
continued direct quotation of a speech and the direct
quotation from another text, complicating,
words,

in Riquelme's

"the problem of determining . . . what is and is not

quoted and what is and is not speech."
Altered by the

English "You!” which connects it to

the two y o u 's of the previous lines,

Baudelaire's line,

like the "blooming" corpse (and like the fleurs du mal
which grow from corruption), revives as something other
than what it was, torn from its original context, altered
by its new location like the literary swag of Eliot's "good
poet" who steals to weld "his theft into a whole of feeling
which is unique, utterly different from that from which it
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was torn."

In Its present constitution, Eliot's Baudelaire

line does bring with, it thematic connections, feeding the
present with the past, acting as what Eliot in "Tradition
and the Individual Talent" called the "present moment of
the past," when that which is “already living" separates
itself from "what is dead." Yet, despite its formal
integration into the "Unreal City" passage, the line
retains all the strangeness of the isolated fragment,
foreign in its words, alien in its presence: it acts
simultaneously as "the present moment of the past" and as
the ruin of the past in the present.
Not only does the intrusion of the Baudelaire
quotation formally implicate the reader in textual
processes, it also implicates him morally by means of the
line's thematic import.

In Baudelaire's poem "Au Lecteur,"

the line (appearing of course with a "vous" rather than an
"I") indicts its reader who to escape from boredom takes a
voluptuary's pleasure in fantasies of violence while safely
sheltered from its reality (C'est 1 'EnnuiI--1'oeil charge
d'un pleur involontaire,/II reve d'echafauds en fumant son
houka.") And in Eliot's poem, the Baudelaire address
implicates the reader, now brother and double of the
writer, in a writing that seems to be able only to occur
through a formal and contextual violence.

Like the

unpleasant but entrancing intimacy of the "you" which Poe's
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criminals force upon their readers, the intimacy between
writer and reader is one which breaks down their mutual
cultivation of a detached spectatorship.

Murder, secret

crime, war, live burial--the reader is implicated in a
polysemous evil that he mistakenly assumes is safely shut
up within the fictive and literal boundaries of the text.
The reader faces his double, his brother in hypocrisy
by means of the "You!" and the "mon," two pronouns which
echo the opening address,

"You who were with me [italics

mine] in the ships at Mylaei,"

it too an exclamation

bristling with the shock of recognition and the claim of
alliance. The three y o u 's link Stetson, their original
antecedent, to the reader and Stetson's interlocutor to the
writer. Although, as we have seen, Stetson cannot, as sole
referent, ultimately shepherd the loose aggregate of
pronouns, this silent metonym of war does generate a
succession of doubles: brothers-in-arms, war dead and
living dead, murderer and accomplice, reader and writer-counterparts arising from a configuration of repeated
pasts, both literary and historical, which, resisting
assimilation into narrative, expose connections between
language and war. Just as Baudelaire's poems grow out of
evil, just as the corpse fertilizes next spring's bloom,
Eliot's words grow out of the remains of other texts,
tracing patterns of mortality both cultural and personal.
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The phrase "Unreal City" will reappear again in "The
Fire Sermon" to introduce another London scene, set at noon
o£ a winter's day, during which Tiresias, another
underworld inhabitant, makes his way through the city. And
in "What the Thunder Said," the city will reappear again,
although now exploding in an apocalyptic vision o£ war that
joins the destruction o£ ancient and modern empires to the
Slaughter of the Innocents and the post-war civil conflict
of Eastern Europe. Only "Unreal" is cited, the word "City"
itself absent, formally swallowed by the passage:
What is that sound high in the air
Murmur of maternal lamentation
Who are those hooded hordes swarming
Over endless plains, stumbling in cracked earth
Ringed by the flat horizon only
What is the city over the mountains
Cracks and reforms and bursts in the violet air
Falling towers
Jerusalem Athens Alexandria
Vienna London
Unreal
London's "Falling towers," once the White Towers of
"The Fire Sermon" now become London Bridge,

"falling down

falling down falling d o w n , " which once carried the protean
crowd of commuters,

soldiers, and ghosts. We know from

Ronald Bush that this nightmare of London's destruction-specifically

its falling bridges and its hallucinatory

quality--owes much to a real nightmare purportedly dreamt
b y Bertrand Russell, who related it to Eliot during the
period that Eliot was working on The Waste L a n d : "After
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seeing troop trains departing from Waterloo,

X used to have

strange visions of London as a place of unreality.

X used

in imagination to see the bridges collapse and sink, and
the whole great city vanish like a morning mist.

Xts

inhabitants began to seem like hallucinations, and X would
wonder whether the world in which X thought X had lived was
a mere product of my own febrile nightmares

. . . .

X spoke

of this to T . S. Eliot, who put it into The Waste L a n d 11
(qtd. in Bush 249). In Eliot's lines the gothic rhetoric of
nightmare collapses into the childish sing-song of nursery
rhyme, gravity collapsing into a giddiness that speaks less
of flippancy than of the coming disintegration of poetic
voice into a series of quotations, now momentarily
unburdened by the appropriating, or as Eliot would have it,
the "amalgamating" voice of modernity.
Fragments from Dante, the Pervigilium Veneris,
Tennyson, Nerval, Kyd, and the Ppanishads lie next to each
other, fragments with which the poet sets his lands in
order, ruins he has shored against his own ruin.

How these

quotations relate to the poem's themes has been extensively
studied, but what has not been noticed is that buried
within the ruins of these quotations, specifically in the
quotation from the Pervigilium Veneris,
another city destroyed,
of language.

lies the ruin of

its destruction linked to a failure

Xf we complete Eliot's allusion to the
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Pervigilium Veneris, we will find, at the end of that
anonymous Latin poem, reference to a city destroyed by
silence:
quando fiam uti chelidon ut tacere desinam?
perdidi musam tacendo, nec me Apollo respicit:
sic Amyclas, cum tacerent, perdidit silentium.
[when shall I be as the swallow, that I may cease
to be voiceless? X have lost the Muse in silence,
nor does Apollo regard me: so Amyclae, being mute,
perished by silence.]
Most commentators believe that the legend of Amyclae,
a city destroyed by silence, referred to the city by that
name a few miles from Sparta which was famous for its
sanctuary dedicated to Apollo and Hyacinth (considering the
importance of the Hyacinth myth to The Waste Land, it might
be appropriate to mention that Hyacinth, according to
legend, was the son of King Amyclas, ruler of Amyclae.)
Reportedly surviving intermittent siege by the Dorians for
over a hundred years, Amyclae was finally captured and
completely destroyed because, according to Servius, the
late Latin Virgilian commentator, its citizens,

"broken by

terror" and rumor, were prohibited by a "broad law" even to
speak of possible attack.

Consequently, when the Dorians

came, the city perished because of its silence, hence the
proverb of "taciturnus Amyclae" or "silentia Amyclae"
(Clementi 263-69).
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Like Amyclae, invisible and silent, the poet of The
Waste Land is figuratively disfigured, invisible in his art
and

voiceless because of language's failure to be anything

but repetitive and belated.

Voicelessness and the

agonistic force of silence produce the proliferation of
other voices, other languages, noises and other signs of
the inarticulate which, paradoxically, give to the poet his
song, a song that arises out of the violations of history.
Thus, the Latin poet can "cease to be voiceless" through
transfiguring his voice into that of the swallow, Procne,
who names the criminal or that of the nightingale,
Philomela, who sings in "inviolable voice" of her
violation. And Hieronymo can reveal the murder of his son
through the cryptic collection of his play's "unknown and
sundry languages."
The formal violence of collection, of citation,
reveals a poetic stratagem of double intent--on the one
hand, to transform the violations of history through a
language already disfigured and insufficient; and, on the
other hand, to be an epitaph for poetry. For if poetry can
be written in The Waste Land only through the linguistic
disfigurement and the personal effacement that citation
provides, then the very method of citation may be seen as a
trope for the end of a poetry that can find its voice only
in the languages of the inarticulate and in verbal
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repetition.

Itself scarred by violence and violation, the

poem through its stratagem to transform the violations of
history into song, deconstructs itself, every form of
verbal repetition, every "withered stump of time," only
repeating the conditions of violation and repression, able
only to gesture to a silence whose fluencies adumbrate the
absent voice of God.

CHAPTER FOUR
FOUR QUARTETS; ELIOT'S DEAD PATROL

On August 9, 1930, Eliot, in a letter to William Force
Stead,

speculated that "between the usual subjects of

poetry and 'devotional' verse, there is a very important
field still very unexplored by modern poets--the experience
of man in search of God, and trying to explain to himself
his intenser human feelings in terms of the divine goal"
(qtd. in Gardner 29). Five years later, just before the
Second World War, Eliot would begin writing of such a
journey in "Burnt Norton," a journey that would end in
"Little Gidding,"

completed during the darkest period of

the war. The idea of a sequence of four poems, each
articulating a different perspective on temporal loss and
the search for origin, and each interacting with the other
like the patterning of themes in a musical quartet, came to
Eliot only after the completion and publication of "Burnt
Norton,11 when the economic and public hazards of war forced
the closing of theaters in London, compelling Eliot to turn
away from his playwriting and back to poetry. The war,
according to Eliot,

"destroyed that impulse for a time, the
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conditions of one's life changed, and one was thrown in on
oneself"

(qtd. in Sinclair 110).

Although Eliot had already abandoned the radically
hermetic styles of The Waste Land and Ash Wednesday for a
more discursive poetry of 'statement,' a poetry more
suitable to the practical demands of the stage, as well as
to his increasing emphasis on what he called "the social
function of poetry," the war encouraged the extension of
the personal themes of "Burnt Norton" into the public and
broadly religious and patriotic themes of the next three
quartets.

Although their thematic and formal multiplicity

overwhelms the normally one-dimensional category of war
poetry, the last three quartets can be read as war poems—
Eliot himself, after all, said that they were "in a sense
war poems"--their temper conditioned by their inception and
completion during the war.1 And, in a first draft of his
lecture "The Three Voices of Poetry," he described the last
three quartets as being "primarily patriotic poems"

(qtd.

in Ackroyd 264), only to delete the phrase on revision, a
deletion understandable in a period of history which had
painfully revealed the thin line between patriotism and the
atrocities of political and religious ideologies. Yet to
its first audience (with the exception of the colder eyes
1 In
Poetry."

the

1958

lecture

"T.

S.

Eliot

Talks

About

his
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of readers like those of the acutely disappointed George
Orwell who whinqpered about the poems'

"gloomy mumblings"),

the poems were generally accepted as patriotic poems, their
themes and symbols closely reacting to specific political
and social needs.
"East Coker"'s historical theme, for example, its
address of the antiquity and endurance of English history
and tradition, is timely, given the poem's being written
and published during the confused and frightening time of
the "Phoney War" when an invasion of England seemed
immanent. Eliot's use of figures of war in the fifth
section of "East Coker" to express the poet's struggle with
words, the
. . . raid on the inarticulate
With shabby equipment always deteriorating
In the general mess of imprecision of feeling.
Undisciplined squads of emotion
was, as Angus Calder states, certainly topical in 1940 when
the average British citizen, waiting for war to begin in
earnest, would have been called to repress his emotions
through discipline:

"Having 'shabby equipment'

(the Home

Guard at first in some places drilled with broomsticks) was
no excuse for not 'trying.'

The citizen's job was to try,

and not to reason why--'The rest is not our business.'
Sub-textually this section can be read as a Conservative
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utterance . . . in favour of unquestioning natural unity in
a common struggle to 'recover what has been lost'"

(ISO-

51) .
The American themes of "Dry Salvages"--Eliot's return
to his American memories and his tribute to the heritage of
the American explorer and sailor, in the context of the
stoic call to "Fare forward"--may have expressed for
British and American readers their shared heritage and
Eliot's support of Britain's vigorous campaign to convince
the U.S. to come into the war. And the allusion in the
third section to Krishna's exhortation to Arjuna to fight
even against his kin, secure in the equipoise of
detachment, can be read as part of the poem's exhortation
to disinterested, self-sacrificing action in the face of
increasing and necessary violence. The poem's maritime
themes and its prayer for the souls of dead seamen came at
the height of the "Battle of the Atlantic," in which Uboats sank hundreds of British and neutral merchant ships
carrying much needed supplies to Britain. The fourth
section's prayer "on behalf of/ Women who have seen their
sons or husbands/ Setting forth, and not returning," would
have had more than a general significance.
And in "Little Gidding," the first draft of which was
written during the worst bombing of London (3,000 killed on
one night), Eliot integrated his experiences as an air raid
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warden with a Dantesque purgatorial vision, evoking the
common experience of the terrifying Blitz and offering a
visionary context larger than the present terrifying one, a
context which offered in the calm reassurance of "And all
3hall be well and/ All manner of thing shall be well" the
faith in what Kathleen Raine, in praise of Eliot's
achievement, then called "the language of humanity" at a
time when victory seemed doubtful.
To their first audience, the poems were received with
an intensity of gratitude and reverence difficult, maybe
impossible, to recreate outside of their specific wartime
context. Lynda11 Gordon has astutely recognized that the
consolations of the last lines, in which human suffering
and divine love are reconciled through the mystical symbol
of the rose,

"remains a mere formula unless it touches the

life of the reader." we have only to contrast the pique of
Graham Martin and Bernard Bergonzi's comments on the
Quartets (Cf. 18) with the comments of its first readers.
Lyndall Gordon refers to the wartime reminiscences of Mary
Lee Settle, an American novelist living in London during
the war. Settle "recalled the impact of Four Quartets when
there really was 'dust in the air' and the ruined rows of
houses stood like empty husks, their wall paper stained
with rain.

At a time when people queued for rations and

suffered loss and privation, Eliot 'had somehow refined
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what he had to tell us, beyond the banality of
disappointment and hopelessness,

into a promise like

steel.' That first generation of readers responded to a
promise of recovery made with a 'miraculous effrontery of
spirit' in the face of years of wrong"

(144).

Noel Annan,

in his recent memoir of British intellectual life during
the war, remembered how "As each Quartet appeared during
the war in its paper cover, you were h umbled.

Eliot's

modesty and gentleness reminded you of other worlds of sin,
repentance and death whether or not you were a Christian.
He did not call you to righteousness as the left-wing poets
of the thirties did.
trivial a life"

He asked you to live a little less

(62).

Yet it was the charge of triviality that worried Eliot
as he wrote the poems.

To his friend Nary Hutchinson,

Eliot worried that if the poems were badly written,

their

triviality and superfluousness would be emphasized (Ackroyd
263).

And in a 1942 letter to Martin Browne, Eliot

expressed what was a common worry among writers of the
time, the sense of

uselessness, and, more important, the

sense of impropriety at working
conflagration:

on verse in

the midst of

"It

is one thing to see what

was best worth

one's while doing,

in a distant retrospect:

but in the

midst of what is going on now,

it is hard, when you sit

down at a desk, to feel confident that morning after
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morning spent fiddling with words and rhythms is a
justified activity -- especially as there is never any
certainty that the whole thing won't have to be scrapped.
And on the other hand, external or public activity is more
of a drug than is this solitary toil which often seems so
pointless"

(qtd. in Gardner 21).

Eliot's misgivings concerning his "fiddling with words
and rhythms"--a phrase which echoes Henry James's concern
at "putting into play mere fiddlesticks"--his fear of being
charged with triviality, may have arisen from the enormous
difficulty of what Eliot was attempting to do and not to
do.

He was not attempting to write a "war poetry," in the

standard sense but only, as he said,

"in a sense,-" indeed,

the Four Quartets do not fit either of his two categories
of war poetry as defined in the 1942 "Poetry in Wartime"
essay, written in the same month "Little Gidding" was first
published. Despite the nature of their first reception and
the strong patriotic tone of certain passages, the poems
are far too private and far too thematically and formally
complex to be classified as a poetry that "expresses and
stimulates pride in the military virtues of a pe o p l e ; 11 and
they certainly are not the "private poetry" of the soldierpoet.

But in the 1942 essay, the point from which this

discussion began, Eliot implies another possible avenue for
a poet writing in wartime, another avenue over and above
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the essay's general exhortation to poets to "preserve and
enrich" the heritage o£ their language.
As we have discussed, Eliot states that to write of
war with the kind of understanding necessary to the writing
of poetry, the experience of war had to "become part of a
man's whole past," to be integrated with other parts of
experience, distanced from the exigencies and distracting
attachments of the present moment, and it, according to
Eliot, would probably "bear fruit in something very
different from what, during time of war, people call
poetry.'"

The contemporaneous,

'war

the present moment, must

fall back into a larger "life," for, as The Waste Land
enacts with the "discourse of quotation" and the Four
Quartets reveals through the technique of psychological
retrospection, the present experience cannot speak to us
until it is part of the past, where although dead in a
sense,

it yet lives in its potential to be transfigured by

the creative act of re-membrance, and in turn, to transform
the p r e s e n t . As the moment remembered can never be the
experienced moment itself, so the experience transformed in
the poetry will "bear fruit in something very different."
Yet from 1940 to 1942 Eliot did (in some sense) write
of his and others' experience of war while he was in the
midst of it, not years after the experience had become part
of his p a s t . And that experience of war was only one part
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of a whole spectrum of past and present experience quoted,
re-collected, and transformed into the Four Quartets. To
become "part of a man's whole p ast," then, also meant to
become part of a past figured into a "poetry," not the
isolated poem that might be generated out of the shock of
war, but the "poetry," which,

in his "Note on War Poetry,"

as we have discussed earlier, Eliot described as a "life"
set in opposition to the situation of war:
It seems just possible that a poem might happen
To a very young man: but a poem is not poetry-That is a life.
War is not a life: it is a situation,
One which may neither be ignored nor accepted,
A problem to be met with ambush and stratagem,
Enveloped and scattered.
The "life" as a poetry, the "poetry" as a life; the
war figured into the life, itself figured into the poetry.
But first, to the life figured as a poetry.
In the Four Quartets, the autobiographical impulse
draws the poetic self's encounters with the contradictions
of existence in time, with those enigmas of temporality and
mortality,

into the ambush of form, which seeks to re-enact

and, as James Olney has demonstrated,
experience as present consciousness"
find a vital pattern ("a poetry")

"to refigure past
(265), and thereby to

in the life, a whole of

feeling that parallels and participates in a larger
transcendent pattern of eternity,

"the still point of the
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turning- world . . . /Where past and future are gathered."
But the search for this pattern involves the sad knowledge
of language's ultimate limitations in charting the elusive
and fugitive feelings of the "unhounded," of the center
(whether of absence or presence is at this point
irrelevant), of that which resists the full reach of
language.
In his lecture "Poetry and Drama,“

Eliot granted a

higher privilege to music, which he thought came closest,
of all the forms of art, to reaching the "indefinite extent
of feeling," the "border" of which "only music can
express." Although poetry moves in the same direction as
music, seeking essentially "an unattainable ideal," "we can
never emulate music, because to arrive at the condition of
music would be the annihilation of poetry"

(93).

The Four Quartets, as even its title implies,
encourages, however, comparison of its form to musical
structures; we know that Eliot was initially inspired by
Beethoven's late quartets and that the structure of the
quartet suggested to him "the notion of making a poem by
weaving in together three or four superficially unrelated
themes: the 'poem' being the degree of success in making a
new whole out of them"
Gardner 26).

(Letter to John Hayward qtd. in

In "The Music of Poetry," a lecture given in

the same year as the publication of the Four Quartets,
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Eliot said that the poet and the musician shared the same
concern with "the sense of rhythm and the sense of
structure," and speculated that because the "use of
recurrent themes is as natural to poetry as to music,"
there "are possibilities for verse which bear some analogy
to the development of a theme by different groups of
instruments; there are possibilities of transitions in a
poem comparable to the different movements of a symphony or
a quartet; there are possibilities of contrapuntal
arrangement of subject-matter"

(32).

Some readers, such as Gabriel Pearson, for example,
have found the musical analogy of the Four Quartets
suspect:
This analogy is infinitely fertile, infinitely
seductive.
It dissolves the most resistent
linearities of the discursive mode, bending them back
upon themselves, making them answerable to the logic
of metaphor and myth. In the timeless image, the tough
contradictions of history are reconciled.
It is a
musical Hegelianism, the antinomies of experience
resolved and transcended in the higher term, which is
the very form of their expression" ("King Log" 34).
And the British poet Geoffrey Hill, more directly hostile
to Eliot's method in the Four Quartets, attacks "the
expansive, outward gesture towards the condition of music"
as a "helpless gesture of surrender, oddly analogous to
that stylish aesthetic of despair, that desire of the
ultimate integrity of silence, to which so much eloquence
has been so frequently and indefatigably devoted"

(9).
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Although both Pearson's and Kill's judgments accurately
diagnose strong tendencies in Eliot's poetry and
characteristics of his poetic temper--the attraction to the
serene purity of silence, the obsession with transcendence
of dichotomies into the reconciliation of formal wholes-they seem to assume that the choice of the musical analogy
in the Four Quartets wholly rests on the conventional
notion of music as an immaterial art, a "spiritual"
phenomenon,

linked in its immateriality to the

transcendent, to the "timeless image," as well as assuming
that Eliot's use of a "musical form" is an attempt to erase
dichotomies through the transcendence into form.
On the contrary, Eliot's alliance of poetry and music
rests, in addition to their dependence on material, on
their mutual dependence on temporality, on their both being
"arts of time."

Thus in "Burnt Norton," Eliot writes,

Words move, music moves
Only in time; but that which is only living
Can only die.
Words, after speech, reach
Into the silence.
Only by the form, the pattern.
Can words or music reach
The stillness, as a Chinese jar still
Moves perpetually in its stillness.
Only really living in the time of their actual execution,
both words and music begin and end as the coming into being
and the falling into death of sound.

Etienne Gilson,

labeling music "the art of that which is to d i e , " describes
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it as an art which, aspires to its own death because "its
parts must fall back into nothingness one by one so that
the whole, of which they are elements, can come into
being." And like music, poetry is made up of sounds which
also move through time (whether read or heard involves the
sometimes complicating difference between external and
internal soundings):

"If the genuine poem is made of words

actually heard, no poem ever exists in its material
totality; only one line of poetry at a time can exist and
of this line only one word, and of this word only one
syllable or vocal emission"

(217).

Unable to embody the simultaneity of form of the
plastic arts, such as that of a Chinese jar, words and
music can only achieve their wholeness,

the "form, the

pattern," outside of their own materiality, beyond the
"stillness of the violin," through the intervening
intelligence of memory which structures sound into living
significations,

into wholes of rhythm and meaning.

Without

the intervention of memory, as Gilson (echoing Augustine)
notes, the elements of musical and poetic sound "would fall
back into the void of silence as they fade if memory did
not forget this unity by endowing these elements with at
least a temporary subsistence and a mode of
intellectuality"

(146).
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The Four Quartets encourages analogies between music,
poetry, and autobiography because of their shared relations
to mortality and time. Music's temporality,

its paradoxical

dependence on its own demise for its very existence,
parallels poetry's exploitation of the reciprocal movement
of creation and loss that is the movement of the word in
time.

And as music's and poetry's achievement of form is

inseparable from a resignation to their own insufficiency,
autobiographical art begins with and is impossible without
the coming into being and the falling into death of
experience, which

is the life of consciousness in

time. As

each musical note

must fall back into the silence

so that

the whole may be composed by memory, so the present
experience,

if it

is to have any meaning, must "die" and

become part of the past where it

can be refigured

and

redeemed by the creative act of memory into present
consciousness, because immediate experience cannot be
intelligible until it ceases to be lived:
We had the experience but missed the meaning,
And approach to the meaning restores the
experience
In a different form.
The form must always be different because memory is not a
bond servant to the past, its compositions never faithful
reproductions, never, as Olney states, the "orderly
summoning up of something dead--a sort of Final Judgment on
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past events." Xn short, memory does not begin "in the fardistant past . . .
present"

that then follows a course to the

(264).

However much an "art of time,“ like music and poetry,
autobiography also can be, because of its impulse to
origin, an art of modernity, its repossession of the past
motivated by its compulsion to bring the significance and
the completion of form to the fragile presentness of
consciousness. George Steiner, discussing the relation of
poesis to self-portraiture, states that "self-portraiture
is the most adversarial mode of creation," because it
expresses the artist's "compulsion to freedom,. . . his
agonistic attempt to repossess, to achieve mastery over the
forms and meanings of his own being" in the face of "the
servitude of his unwilled, unchosen coming into the world,
and in the face of the absurd, unnaming logic of death"
(Presences 205, 206). Thus in the self-portraits of
Rembrandt, the contrast of emergent form and surrounding
darkness expresses the coming into being of a self, or more
accurately, of a persona, out of a dark nothingness which
precedes and frames it, the darkness of death held at bay
by the formal seizure of the painter's face in time.
To create a portrait of the present self through the
movement of language, however, necessitates the return to
and the integration of what Olney describes as "all the
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old, half-remembered, or perhaps misremembered selves,
which were adequate to their own proper moments,

into the

pattern of the new self, which is born in the moment now
out of this very exercise of consciousness and memory"
(264-65) . In the Four Quartets, the creation of such a
pattern involves the problematic discrepancy between form
and experience and the resultant provisionality of present
consciousness.

The "now" of our consciousness ordinarily

exists only as two simultaneous movements in time: first,
the falling back into the past and the subsequent
modification of "all we have been," which is memory, and
second, the springing forward into the future, which is
perception. Thus, the present, never self-originating,
exists as a collapse into the past or, to borrow Bergson's
image, a treading upon the future (180)2. The return to
and the integration of the past into the present, which
makes identity and self-consciousness possible, therefore,
must be a continual process of transformation.
But in the Four Quartets, the presence of
consciousness is not synonymous with the present of

2 My argument here is indebted to Bergson's definition
of the simultaneity of memory and perception in his
discussion of the phenomenon of deja vu: "I hold that the
formation of memory is never posterior to the formation of
perception; it is contemporaneous with it. Step by step, as
perception is created, the memory of it is projected beside
it, as the shadow falls beside the body" (157-58) .
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ordinary consciousness. In "Burnt Norton," we are told that
Time past and time future
Allow but a little consciousness.
To be conscious is not to be in time.
We only achieve true consciousness in rare moments when
time feels suspended and reality seems a fullness of being
gathered within a moment of eternity. Inexpressible, except
through metaphor, and unlocalizable like Bradley's
"immediate experience,11 it comes as
the unattended
Moment, the moment in and out of time.
The distraction fit, lost in a shaft of sunlight,
The wild thyme unseen, or the winter lightning
Or the waterfall, or music heard so deeply
That it is not heard at all, but you are the music
While the music lasts.
This "presence of consciousness" lives as music lives;
somatic and interior,

it passes away and dissolves into

"waste sad time/Stretching before and after," leaving
behind the feeling that just for a moment we returned, as
in the deja v u , to a place of origin,

"the first world" of

the rose-garden:
I can only say, there we have been: but I cannot say
where
And I cannot say, how long, for that is to place it in
time.
Because these experiences,

like the mystic's, come

with the force of the inarticulate and can only be
expressed through the indirection and displacement of the
figurative, the form of the Four Quartets, paralleling
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memory's constant return to and figuration of the past into
the present, brings these experiences within the
circumference of poetry's reach by the process of
repetition and transfiguration of images, words, rhythms,
and styles.

Hugh Kenner first stated that the last three

quartets "exfoliate" from the transcendent "moment in the
rose-garden" of "Burnt Norton," many of their images and
figures a compression and repetition of those from the
opening quartet

(Invisible 296), yet each quartet also

spirals out from other personal experiences with the
timeless, their figures also drawn into the concentric
patterning of the poetry.
This "motif technique," according to James Olney,
evokes and yet transforms the past as each motif acquires
new and richer significances with its introduction and
reintroduction into new contexts offered by the overall
pattern, which like that of music, embodies both the
circular return and integration of memory and the linear
movement of the present's progress into the future.
There are many pasts, however, which are repeated.
Most immediately, the poems repeat their own pasts, if
again we think of them as existing in the time of their
reading; earlier passages are quoted,

integrated, and

thereby transformed into larger patterns of meaning.
Lyndall Gordon has compared this pattern of repetition to
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the essays of Emerson "where each sentence is selfcontained but repeats, in different terms, the same idea"
and Whitman's use of the sermon's tactic where each "unit,
whether homely or poetic, is designed to awaken the
audience on different levels, to the same revelation"
97).

(96-

Therefore, the repetition and interplay of beginnings

and ends: the opening line of "East Coker"--"In my
beginning is my end"--is quoted in reversal at the
quartet's closing,

"In my end is my beginning," and again

picked up and modified in "Dry Salvages":
When time stops and time is never ending;
And the ground swell, that was from the beginning
and finally completed in the last section of "Little
Gidding" with the lines
What we call the beginning is often the end
And to make an end is to make a beginning.
Framing the poet's imaginative progress from East
Coker to the America of his childhood memories of S t .
Louis, the Mississippi and Cape Ann and back to the present
moment in the church at Little Gidding, each repetition
complicates the poet's own repetition of his "beginnings"
and "ends," by expanding the poet's experience into a
larger circumference of beginnings and endings, which
includes the pasts of others before him. Thus his journey
repeats his ancestor Andrew Elyot's voyage to America and
by implication, the Puritan journey away from history into
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the experiment of modernity, parallelling the poet's own
search for origin.
The rupture in time at the open field in East Coker
offers the melancholic vision of sixteenth-century
Breughel-like peasants at dance.

The rhythms of their

circling and leaping, of their "Feet rising and falling"
over the dirt which covers those gone before them now
"nourishing the corn," keep the time of cyclical death and
rebirth, of "Dung and death."

The fall into the darkness

of death is repeated in the third section's fall into the
darkness of history of the contemporary "eminent," whether
"industrial lords and petty contractors," or "generous
patrons of a r t , the statesmen and the rulers." And at the
end of the guartet, before the poet's journey to America,
we will find that the pattern of the life fulfilled in the
poetry repeats the patterns of other lives, of "dead and
living":
. . . Not the intense moment
Isolated, with no before and after,
But a lifetime burning in every moment
And not the lifetime of one man only
But of old stones that cannot be deciphered.
And in "Dry Salvages," the poet will "repeat"
. . . I have said before
That the past experience revived in the meaning
Is not the experience of one life only
But of many generations.
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There is yet one more life, one more past repeated and
transformed in the poem, that of the reader.
Unlike The Waste Land, in which the "discourse of
(Quotation " foregrounds the "written-ness," the scripted
word, encouraging spatial metaphors (such as the montage or
the cubist work), words in the Four Quartets announce
themselves as voiced, as sounds falling through a
surrounding silence into the echo chamber of the reader's
consciousness, seeking the engagement of memory:
Footfalls echo in the memory
Down the passage which we did not take
Towards the door we never opened
Into the rose-garden. My words echo
Thus, in your mind.
Before we get to the last sentence, we are in the position
of an audience,

invisible and disinterested, reading of

another "we," of the poet and someone else, and of their
remembrance figured as the movement of footfalls down a
passage, but the last sentence's startling address to us
localizes our consciousness within the poem so that the
sounds of the footfalls echoing become also the sound of
Eliot's words moving through our memory, the figurative
"passage" of memory becoming the literal "passage" of the
text which passes into the interior corridors of our memory
(a word-play similar to "Gerontion"'s punning with textual
and cranial "passages").
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The identification of words as sounds made living
significations by the memory does more here, of course,
than merely reveal the crucial dependence, as defined by
Gilson, of poetry and music on memory and time. The poet's
words, echoing in our minds, engage our own act of memory
so that we join the "footfalls" of the poet's imaginative
retrospection of the rose garden. Unlike the Stetson
passage of The Waste Land, where the reader's presence is
discovered, condemned and banished by the force of
exclamation, here the reader is gently invited in, made
part of the journey of the poem. From this point on, we
follow the directions of the poet's voice, bringing to
those figures of consciousness our own, becoming part of
the process of expansion from the private experience to
representative experience. Thus, the studied, ahistorical
abstractness of much of the poems' figures--the rose, the
garden, children laughing in the leaves, the waterfall,
dust, sunlight and lightning, movement and stillness--and
the related submersion of the specific personal sources of
many of these figures are meant to evoke a universal
experience.

James Olney states that in the poet's

disappearance into "patterns of universalized experience,"
in the disappearance of the "personal and historic Eliot,"
the "I" and the "we" are transformed into "not the historic
and typical but the representative and symbolic"

(305).
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The Impulse behind this transformation of the private
into the universal, or to go back to the "Note on War
Poetry,"
the abstract conception
Of private experience at its greatest intensity
Becoming universal, which we call 'poetry',
is part of the attempt to create what I earlier called "a
life above a life," a wholeness completed through a moving
pattern whose details are formed by the repetition of
history in consciousness.

And in this "life," which is the

"poetry" of the Four Quartets, war functions in two ways.
First, war, as the general historical context of the poems,
in its immediate danger impels the poem's search for a
transcendent pattern, serving as a menacing counterpoint to
the poem's ascending rhythms. Second, as in the "Note on
War Poetry" in which the war is "enveloped and scattered"
by the form of the symbolic, the historical reality of war
is transfigured into a trope for the poet's own war with
language and tradition to create the perfection of the
symbol which will draw into and around itself, like the
"still point," the past and future. This figural merging of
war and literary construction, however, as in Gerontion and
The Waste Land, exposes the ultimate failure of poetry to
transcend history, but in The Four Quartets, the failure is
revealed as one without which poetry could not exist
because its form is always in some sense a hybrid of that
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which is dying and empty and that which is present and
living,

just as music's "victorious ability to affirm the

being that it creates is inseparable from its essential
resignation to its own demise"

(Gilson 146).

The theme of return and repetition in the Four
Quartets, or to use Olney's phrase, of "recall and
recapitulation," extends to Eliot's own body of work
(another of the repeated pasts of the poems), and in "East
Coker" and "Little Gidding," the figuration of war occurs
in passages that recall and respond to passages in
“Gerontion" and in The Waste L a n d , where we have already
traced the merging of historical and formal violence.

But

before we extend the Four Quartets' "quotations" into other
poems, we must first look at how the second and fifth
sections of "East Coker” return to and transform the
corresponding sections of “Burnt Norton."
Close studies by many readers have demonstrated how
the quartets' five-part structures thematically and
formally parallel each other. For example, the second
sections of "Burnt Norton" and "East Coker" both open in a
lyrical style which then dissipates into a more discursive,
"philosophic" style, and the fifth sections of each poem
deal with the issue of language, but another parallel
exists. The lyrics of the second sections both involve the
enclosure of violence and war by the aesthetic, and the
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figures of war in "East Coker"'s second and fifth sections
repeat, complicate, and finally critique this enclosure of
historical violence.
The opening of the second section of "Burnt Norton," a
lyric in the symbolist style that even echoes Mallarme,3
celebrates the reconcilement of opposites through the
ascending pattern of correspondences figured in the rhythms
of a music and dance of being:
Garlic and sapphires in the mud
Clot the bedded axle-tree.
The trilling wire in the blood
Sings below inveterate scars
And reconciles forgotten wars.
The dance along the artery
The circulation of the lymph
Are figured in the drift of stars
Ascend to summer in the tree
We move above the moving tree
In light upon the figured leaf
And hear upon the sodden floor
Below, the boarhound and the boar
Pursue their pattern as before
But reconciled among the stars.
History's "inveterate scars," its "forgotten wars," its
predators and victims pursuing the endless cycle of
aggression and death, which fashions history's narrative,
are absorbed into a pattern of ascending correspondences
spiralling from the ground of the inorganic through the
vitality of the animate and finally to the heavens, where
3 See Mallarme's "M'introduire dans ton histoire, " where
occurs the line "Tonnerre et rubis aux moyeux," and see "Le
tombeau de Charles Baudelaire,11 where the image of "boue et
rubis" occurs (174).
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the eternal forms of the constellations figure and
reconcile the mortal configurations below into one eternal,
unmoving pattern.
Five years later, in a time of war, the poet returns
in "East Coker"'s second section, the most melancholic
section of the guartets, to repeat and to critigue the
lyrical enclosure and transcendence of war, a lyricism that
in the context of war must seem a dangerous naivete.

Like

the "Burnt Norton" passage, the "East Coker" lyric
continues in the symbolist style to express the mirroring
of the heavenly in the earthly, mortal patterns reflecting
the immortal. Mallarme's line "Tonnerre et rubis aux
moyeux" now gives Eliot the “Thunder" which "Simulates
triumphal cars," cars alluding to the last line of
Mallarme's "M'introduire dans ton histoire":
vesperal de mes chars."

"Du seul

Seasonal chaos replaces the

languid summer of the moving leaf figured in the light;
movements of frustrated ascent, the falling movements of
"writhing" and "tumbling down" contrast with the
oscillating harmony of descent and ascent along the "summer
in the tree," the axle-tree:
What is the late November doing
With the disturbance of the spring
And creatures of the summer heat,
And snowdrops writhing under feet
And hollyhocks that aim too high
Red into grey and tumble down
Late roses filled with early snow?
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Climatic disturbances mirror astrological wars, where stars
no longer drifting, no longer reconciling "forgotten wars"
by their constellated patterns, whirl in their own
hostilities, the Sun and the Moon going down just as the
hollyhocks below "tumble down":
Thunder rolled by the rolling stars
Simulates triumphal cars
Deployed in constellated wars
Scorpion fights against the Sun
Until the Sun and Moon go down.
The boarhound's chase of the boar becomes in heaven
a hunt through Eliot's pun on the Leonids, meteor showers,
which like comets,

in their rarity portend historical

calamity:
Comets weep and Leonids fly
Hunt the heavens and the plains
Whirled in a vortex that shall bring
The world to that destructive fire
Which burns before the ice-cap reigns.
The lyric's whirling vortex of apocalypse and its
extravagant diction return us both to the thematic vortex
of "fractured atoms" and to the voluptuary rhetoric of
"Gerontion." Although the "East Coker" lyric reverses the
theme of the "Burnt Morton" lyric by contrasting cosmic war
with universal reconciliation, it nevertheless repeats the
distancing and refining effects of the formal enclosure of
the violent--effects that are abruptly suspended by the
intrusion of the poet's censoring comments, which, in their

154
dry, colloquial tone and discursive style expose the
artificiality and irrelevancy of the lyric:
That was a way of putting it--not very satisfactory:
A periphrastic study in a worn-out poetical fashion.
The censure here involves, however, more than the
abandonment of the outmoded symbolist style in favor of a
more contemporary one. The issue concerns the lyric's
failure to figure "it"--the war. The lyric's periphrasis,
its attempt to circumlocute and thus to displace the
reality of war into the aesthetic,

is rejected,

Leaving one still with the intolerable wrestle
With words and meanings.
The figuration of war returns to its point of origin,

the

p o e t 's own war with language to represent and thus to bring
an intelligibility to the historical situation at hand.
The ensuing lines then orchestrate an intricate pattern of
ambiguous reference that brings together poetry, history,
and war:
The poetry does not matter,
it was not (to start again) what one had expected
The "It" here can refer to its immediate antecedent,

“the

poetry, “ and t h u s , can indicate both the p o e t 's despondent
recognition of the irrelevancy of his medium in the larger
movements of history and, more immediately, his abandonment
of the lyric mode as a viable vehicle for his meaning.
will "start again" in another discourse.

The "It,"

He
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however, can also refer to what the poetry was trying to
communicate in the first place, to the "it" of "That was a
way of putting it"--to the war figured in the opening
lyric- To "start again," to attempt again to represent the
war as history's "horrific capability," is to backtrack
over the rhetorical euphony of Eliot's lyric and,

in turn,

because of the lyric's echoing of the grandiloquence of
Gerontion's words, to return to the themes of "Gerontion,"
except now, because "the poetry does not matter,"
"Gerontion"'s deploring of history's betrayal returns
divested of its rhetorical theatrics:

What was to be the value of the long looked forward to.
Long hoped for calm, the autumnal serenity
And the wisdom of age? Had they deceived us
Or deceived themselves, the quiet-voiced elders.
Bequeathing us merely a receipt for deceit?
The serenity only a deliberate hebetude.
The wisdom only the knowledge of dead secrets
Useless in the darkness into which they peered
Or from which they turned their e y e s .
Gerontion's hebetude, his blindness, and his deceits as
figures for the consciousness of Europe confused by the
shock of the First World War return again in a new context
of another world war, one which again has revealed the
discrepancy between expectations of historical and moral
progress and "what the treacherous years were all the while
making for."

Because poetry is also a historical
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"receipt," in the sense of a recipe or formula4, it
participates in and is engendered by all the "recipes for
deceit," the formulas of the historian,

the politician,

the

artist, of all the "quiet-voiced elders" of literary
history, as Eliot's own "periphrastic" formula deceives in
its figuration of the violence of war into its eloquent
textures.
But Eliot here returns to a former poetry, in a way to
a former version of his poetic self, returns not just, as
he feared time and again to iTohn Hayward during the
drafting of the poems,5 to repeat himself but rather to
integrate and to transfigure "Gerontion"'s old fear of
history's betrayal and its resultant suspicion of the
historically sedimented nature of language into a present
awareness of the necessary provisionality and distortion of
all constructs:
The knowledge imposes a pattern, and falsifies.
For the pattern is new in every moment
And every moment is a new and shocking
Valuation of all we have been.
Nevertheless,

in the face of the incomprehensibility of a

history whose rationale repeatedly defeats our willed forms
4 Answering John Hayward's puzzlement over the word's
meaning, Eliot explained that he meant "Receipt, I mean of
course in the sense of recipe or formula" (qtd. in Gardner
101 ).
5 See selections from the Eliot-Hayward correspondence
in Gardner 23-25.
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and comprehension, we are left, not in Dante's "middle
way," but "all the way, in a dark wood."
The immediate concern with imposing an aesthetic form
upon the "situation" of war, with which the section opens,
by the end of the section has been integrated into a larger
problem of the belatedness of language, which by its
nature, must always lag behind the flux of experience
because of our dependence on memory, which must always, as
we have seen, be transforming and yet transformed by the
unexpected. The only answer becomes "the wisdom of
humility"--the knowledge that every construct, every
"recall and recapitulation," every poem enacts its own
mortality, the inevitability of becoming "worn-out." And
this humility must be "endless," for there is no end to the
process of return and recovery, even in the face of the
inevitability of failure and mortality when, as the section
ends.
The houses are all gone under the sea
The dancers are all gone under the hill.
In the fifth section of "East Coker," the poet
retrieves the violent imagery of the fifth section of
"Burnt Norton," in which the struggle of words to contain
both the "beginning and the end," the wholeness of the
unbounded still center,

is figured in a violence which
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assaults the word:
Words strain
Crack and sometimes break, under the burden,
Under the tension, slip, slide, perish,
Decay with imprecision, will not stay in place,
Will not stay still.
This violence within the word, in the fifth section of
“East Coker" becomes a war between the word and the
inarticulate, between the staticizing form of language and
the experiential, which in its flux is "new in every
moment."

The menace and enchantment of the "middle way" of

history's "grimpen" of the second section becomes the
private "middle way" of the middle-aged Eliot, who now
figures his own poetic career as a war with language, a

war

itself framed by two wars:
So here X am, in the middle way, having had twenty years-Twenty years largely wasted, the years of l'entre deux
guerres —
Trying to learn to use words, and every attempt
Is a wholly a new start, and a different kind of failure
Because one has only learnt to get the better of words
For the thing one no longer has to say, or the way in which
One is no longer disposed to say it. And so each venture
Is a new beginning, a raid on the inarticulate
With shabby equipment always deteriorating
In the general mess of imprecision of feeling,
Undisciplined squads of emotion.
Eliot's figuration of war into his private concerns, his
use of war to ground and to figure lyrical anxieties here
repeats the collapse of the second section's poetic
enclosure of war into its point of origin, the poet's own
war.

The war collapses back onto the life, but just as in
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the second section, where the poet's "intolerable
wrestling" to bring form to the war leads to a general
network of correspondences between poetry, history, and
war, the following lines, in their figuration of war, merge
the poet's personal confrontation with the paradoxes of his
modernity with the war's succession of military victory and
loss manifested in the push and pull of territorial
borders, expanding the life of the poet into a greater
"life," in which we all participate--the final appeal
transcending the aesthetic into the political immediacy of
necessary and indifferent action:
And what there is to conquer
By strength and submission, has already been discovered
Once or twice, or several times, by men whom one cannot
hope
To emulate--but there is no competition-There is only the fight to recover what has been lost
And found and lost again: and now, under conditions
That seem unpropitious. But perhaps neither gain nor loss.
For us, there is only the trying.
The rest is not our
business.
The second section of "Little Gidding" returns to the
theme of the violence of writing, but now war is no longer
figured and absorbed into the poet's private war with
language and mortality; the metaphoric impetus recedes into
a metonymic contiguity of the situation of war and the
necessary violence and mortality of all writing. The
nightly bombing of London, the eerie stillness of the
devastation revealed at daylight, and Eliot's experiences
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as an air raid warden and a fire-watcher find themselves in
the opening lyric, which unlike the first two lyrics we
have looked at, carry a precision of observation:
Ash on an old man's sleeve,
is all the ash the burnt roses leave.
Dust in the air suspended
Marks the place where the story ended.
Dust inbreathed was a house-The wall, the wainscot and the mouse.
The death of hope and despair.
This is the death of air.
There are flood and drouth
Over the eyes and in the mouth
Dead water and dead sand
Contending for the upper hand.
The parched eviscerate soil
Gapes at the vanity of toil.
Laughs without mirth.
This is the death of earth.
Explosions falling through the sky literally meant a "death
of a i r , 11 and the dust, ash, and smoke often lay in thick
folds in the air for hours after a night of bombing so that
an old man's sleeve, especially that of a fire-warden
standing in observation on a roof-top, would have been
covered wi t h ash. Dust would have been all that was left of
a house or building, and where the ground was "parched" and
"eviscerate," as cables and broken sewer pipes would have
been exposed in the broken street, water flooding the
streets, buckets of sand and water gathered to put out the
smoldering fires--"the death of water and fire."
Lyndall Gordon has remarked that "the feat of Eliot's
greatest poetry was to convert urban reality into
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nightmare, hallucination, vision," and just as the First
World War offered Eliot the trope of a city of the living
dead, as well as the image of tradition as a rubble, the
Second World War bombing of London offers a landscape
"already ready-made for vision"

(130).

The vision of this

section--the encounter with the "compound ghost" and the
related convergence of Dante's inferno with the streets of
London--consciously recalls the Stetson passage of The
Waste Land, in which the city achieved a spectral
transparency between past and present allowing for the
violent encounter between the poet and the mute Stetson,
who, as we have seen, is a metonym of war.

But, unlike the

Stetson passage, where war is buried in the figure of the
silent Stetson and is used to figure the formal violence of
the "discourse of quotation," in the "Little Gidding"
passage, war is the locus and catalyst for the encounter
between the "dead master" and the living poet:
in the uncertain hour before the morning
Near the ending of interminable night
At the recurrent end of the unending
After the dark dove with the flickering tongue
Had passed below the horizon of his homing
While the dead leaves still rattled on like tin
Over the asphalt where no other sound was
Between three districts whence the smoke arose
I met one walking, loitering and hurried.
The "intersection of time" occurs when "two worlds become
much like each other,11 when, in an inversion of Dante's
journey, the dead ascend to our world, like Hamlet's ghost,

during the intersection time between night and morning,

in

the coming approach of dawn when the light and the time are
uncertain.

It comes as the "ending of interminable night/

At the recurrent end of the unending"--lines which again
respond to the literal experience of the aftermath of an
air-raid, when one is uncertain that the raid is over, and
the end of the raid is only an "end of the unending,"
because the bombing will again begin with the next night
and the next night, all dawns and all mornings only
interim, uncertain periods in "one interminable n i g h t , "
which is the war.
dark dove,

The bomber's descent as the descent of a

its fiery discharge a "flickering tongue,"

inverts the traditional symbol of the descent of the white
Pentecostal dove which baptizes with tongues of flame,
delivering in its inspiration the mastery of language; the
"flickering tongue" of the bomber, however, as a descent of
an infernal pentecost, disfigures the landscape, allowing
for a figuration in which the dead and the living are given
a momentary grace of communication. The literal
disfigurement of the city itself figures a narrative of
death, opening a space for the poet's own meditation on his
relation to past tradition.
Instead of The Waste L a n d 's flowing crowd of souls
that moves over London Bridge, their march punctuated by
their sighs and the sounds of bells, the city here is

empty, silent except for the "metal leaves" of shrapnel
rattling over the asphalt. The poet's encounter with the
"down-turned face" of the ghost

(recalling the down-turned

faces of The Waste L a n d 's commuters), his "pointed scrutiny
with which we challenge/The first met stranger in the
waning dusk" marks his persona (in contrast to that of
commuter of the Stetson passage) as a sentinel on patrol,
his duty to challenge and identify anyone who should not be
on the street before the all-clear siren. Upon meeting,
ghost and sentinel will tread "the pavement in a dead
patrol" like the military comrades of the Stetson passage.
And as in the Stetson passage, where the "X" and the
"you's" initiate complex referential patterns, drawing,

in

their ambiguity, a series of doubles, of brothers-in-arms,
murderers and co-conspirators, readers and writers,

linking

various pasts through the doubling of texts, the doubling
of the ghost, who is defined as "compound," as well as of
the poet who will "assume a double part," is prepared for
by a yoking of opposites.

As just noted, the "interminable

n i g h t ” is "ending," the "unending" is a "recurrent end."
The ghost moves slowly and quickly,

"walking,

loitering and

hurried," the present participles matched with a past
participle; the poet's "sudden look" reveals someone whom
he has known, yet forgotten, yet "half-recalled,11 an
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understandable series o£ opposites since the "dead master"
is "both one and m any.11
He is a "familiar compound ghost," who is both
intimate and unidentifiable. A representative figure for
all the past influences on Eliot--Yeats, Joyce, Mallarme,
Shelley, Swift,

Dante are the ones most mentioned by

readers--he, as Kenner has it, "embodies also the
simultaneity of the literary past"

(Invisible 321) .

In the

Stetson passage, Eliot embodied such a simultaneity through
the juxtaposition of indirect and direct quotations of
"ruined" texts, tracing patterns of mortality both cultural
and personal.

Here, there are no fragments from the texts

of "dead masters," but only a vague allusiveness making up
the "compound ghost" who is not constructed through the
interpenetration of literary sources but through the
integration of the poet's creative consciousness of those
sources, an integration, in a sense, of what Olney calls
all the "past Eliots"

(303).

Like the hooded Christ on the road to Emaeus, like the
disguised Odysseus, or like Dante's encounter with Brunetto
Latini (the original source of this passage), like all
recognition scenes, this scene begins with the uncertainty
before recognition, an uncertainty that arises out of the
co-existence of familiarity and strangeness that is part of
any encounter between self and other.

The other's visage
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is familiar, intimate because as human if mirrors and
confirms our own, yet it is strange, unidentifiable,
impenetrable because it is yet not our own. For the
encounter to be fully realized into the communion of self
and other, or more specifically here, of past and present,
of the living and dead, of spiritual and material,
annunciations and identifications are required. The poet's
cry to Stetson,

its merging of the forces of recognition

and accusation in its "you," received no response, the
silent Stetson, as Donoghue stated, merely operating as an
absent center for a series of violent interrogations. In
the "Little Gidding" passage, annunciation and recognition
occur through a doubling of the poet into the dead master
who becomes both questioner and respondent:
So I assumed a double part, and cried
And heard another's voice cry: 'What are you here?'
Although we were not.
I was still the same,
Knowing myself yet being someone other-And he a face still forming; yet the words sufficed
To compel the recognition they preceded.
With the assumption of a "double part," reminiscent of
Gerontion's doubling into spectator and actor and of the
poet's doubling and re-doubling of voices in The Waste
L a n d , the "I" of the poet becomes as provisional, as
compound, as familiar and strange, as intimate and
impenetrable as the ghostly visage before him, and thus as
representative as the self whose consciousness the poems
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are metaphors for.

As the ghost is made up of a

"repetition" of former selves, of former influences and
masters, his visage cannot be deciphered or animated,
except through its repetition and reanimation by the
beholder's self-dramatization, the poet's granting the mask
of his own presentness to the past, so that it may speak,
its repetitions no longer spelling the exhaustion and
emptiness of the textual repetition of The Waste Land but
indicating the fulfillment of the past in the present.
Two contrasting themes run through the ghost's
soliloquy. First, walking through a scene of violent
destruction, the "dead master" reveals the mortality of all
writing, that every word, every poem, inevitably falls into
the obsolescence or the oblivion of the past:
Last season's fruit is eaten
And the fullfed beast shall kick the empty pail.
For last year's words await another voice.
And next year's words await another voice.
So, in this passage, in a

quartet which will ultimately

reveal the use of memory as the liberation from history and
death, the threat of amnesia haunts the passage as a
counterpoint of death.

The poet, urging the ghost to

speak, admits that he "may not comprehend, may not
remember."

And, as the ghost is "not eager to rehearse/My

thought and theory which you have forgotten," so will
Eliot's be forgotten after having "served their purpose:
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let them be." This reminder of the mortality, however,

is

meliorated by the actuality that the past can speak in the
present in ways unforeseen by the past, that, as John
Riquelme states,

"the fate of writing and of the past in

general is always to be understood in ways that could not
be anticipated"

(64) . Thus the voice from the past finds

"words 1 never thought to speak/In streets X never thought
to revisit."

And thus, in the first section of "Little

Gidding," we are told.
And what the dead had no speech for, when living,
They can tell you, being dead: the communication
Of the dead is tongued with fire beyond the language of the
living.
Through the appropriation and transfiguration of the
past by the present text, the words of the dead transcend
their creators' lives, achieving new meanings and new
significances through which the present can see its own
face; in the same way the present text, in its repetition
and transfiguration of the past,

"speaks itself free"

through its formal confounding of temporality, just as in
the "life," memory appropriates and redeems the deadness of
the past into the moment of present consciousness. When the
ghost refers to "the passage,"
which now presents no hindrance
To the spirit unappeased and peregrine
Between two worlds become much like each other,

a passage opened by the violent rupture of war, we might
first think of metaphorical passages--the passage between
the underworld and the "middle world, 11 the passage to the
"rose-garden," Alice's rabbit's passage, the passages of
war or the passages of history down which blind men
stumble--but familiar with Eliot's punning on the word
passage, we know that this passage which allows the past
poets and past selves to speak through the ventriloquist
self also denotes the passage of the text before us, where
indeed Dante, or Shelley, or Yeats, or Joyce, or Eliot's
words make palpable, in their passing, through their willed
and sometimes violent meeting with the "logic of death,”
(for which, as Riquelme states,
adequate language"

"the living have no

(65)), not only the mortal root of all

writing but also a metaphor for resurrection.

EPILOGUE

Apropos of Eliot's play on ends and beginnings, this
study began with the lining up of charges, both direct and
implied, against the poet of the Four Quartets, charges
emanating from a complex web of assumptions concerning
normative relations of poetry to the barbarism of modern
war, to modernity and authenticity, and to political and
moral relevance.

To investigate the implications of

Eliot's figuration of war, we began with the first "post
war" poem,

“Gerontion," written after the first of the deux

guerres that framed Eliot's poetic career, continued with
the second "post-war" poem. The Waste Land, and finally
ended where we began, with Eliot's poetry of the Second
world War, the Four Quartets.

This apparently

chronological movement was not meant to begin at the
beginning, to seek some genetic development of Eliot's
thoughts on the relation of war to poetry as expressed in
the poems, as if to trace the unified development of an
"idea in progress" from 1919 to 1942. Rather, because
Eliot's figuration of war in the Four Quartets occurs in
passages that "repeat" "Gerontion" and The Waste Land, and,
169
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in turn, because these passages are part of a larger whole
of the "recall and recapitulation" of a "poetic life, 11 it
was more appropriate to follow Eliot's own direction: to
"start again," to return to the beginning, to seek out the
individual pasts of the "life," to establish their nature,
and then to return to the point from which we began, the
Four Quartets, not so much to put forward a defense, an
apologia, as to demonstrate how the poetry itself, both in
its beginnings and its ends, anticipated and grappled with
the charges made long after its publication.
The figuration of war, significantly more apparent in
the Four Quartets than in the earlier poems, stands as a
trope, however unstable, for the problematic correlation of
the poetic and the historical in a time of total war when
all cultural forms seemed suddenly deprived of their
innocence.

To write poetry in a time of war, for T. S.

Eliot, was to confront the accusations of history's
"horrific capability," accusations of poetry's complicity,
of its irrelevance, of its inadequacy.

To figure such a

threat into the poetry meant not to cancel or to evade
history's accusatory colloquy but, by giving it form, to
articulate the necessary implication of all writing in the
conditions of history.

It is, however, this very freedom

of willed form and the subsequent opportunity for the
encounters and valedictions of past and present, the
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precarious encounter of reader and writer, repeated and
transformed by each generation--like that of Eliot's
compound-ghost--which give, to use George Steiner's phrase,
the "edge of conjecture" to the transcendence of mortality.
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